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THE DIFFERENCE IN WOMEN'S HEDONIC LIVES: A 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF FEMINIST 
LEGAL THEORY 
Robin L. West* 
INTRODUCTION 
Women's subjective, hedonic lives are different from men's. The 
quality of our suffering is different from that of men's, as is the nature 
of our joy. Furthermore, and of more direct concern to feminist law-
yers, the quantity of pain and pleasure enjoyed or suffered by the two 
genders is different: women suffer more than men. The two points 
are related. One reason that women suffer more than men is that 
women often find painful the same objective event or condition that 
men find pleasurable. The introduction of oxymorons in our vocabu-
lary, wrought by feminist victories, evidences this difference in wo-
men's and men's hedonic lives. The phrases "date-rape," for example 
and "sexual harassment," capture these different subjective exper-
iences of shared social realities: For the man, the office pass was sex 
(and pleasurable), for the woman, it was harassment (and painful); 
for the man the evening was a date-perhaps not pleasant, but cer-
tainly not frightening-for the woman, it was a rape and very scary 
indeed. Similarly, a man may experience as at worst offensive, and at 
best stimulating, that which a woman finds debilitating, dehumanizing 
or even life-threatening. Pornographic depictions of women which fa-
cilitate by legitimating the violent brutalization of our bodies are obvi-
ous examples. Finally, many men are simply oblivious-they do not 
experience at aU-external conditions which for women are painful, 
frightening, stunting, torturous and pervasive-including domestic vi-
olence in the home, sexual assault on the street, and sexual harass-
ment in the workplace and school. 
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Feminists generally agree-it should go without saying-that wo-
men suffer in ways which men do not, and that the gender-specific 
suffering that women endure is routinely ignored or trivialized in the 
larger (male) legal culture. Just as women's work is not recognized or 
compensated by the market culture,l women's injuries are often not 
recognized or compensated as injuries by the legal culture. The dis-
missal of women's gender-specific suffering comes in various forms, 
but the outcome is always the same: women's suffering for one reason 
or another is outside the scope of legal redress. Thus, women's dis-
tinctive, gender-specific injuries are now or have in the recent past 
been variously dismissed as trivial (sexual harassment on the street); 
consensual (sexual harassment on the job); humorous (non-violent 
marital rape); participatory, subconsciously wanted, or self-induced 
(father/daughter incest); natural or biological, and therefore inevita-
ble (childbirth); sporadic, and conceptually continuous with gender-
neutral pain (rape, viewed as a crime of violence); deserved or private 
(domestic violence); non-existent (pornography); incomprehensible 
(unpleasant and unwanted consensual sex) or legally predetermined 
(marital rape, in states with the marital exemption). 2 
1. See generally Benston, The Political Economy of Womens Liberation, reprinted in 
From Feminism to Liberation, E. Altbach ed. 199-210 (1971); 1. Gardiner, Women's 
Domestic Labor, 89 New Left Review 47 (1975) and1. Landes, Wages for Housework: 
Subsidizing Capitalism, 2 Quest: A Feminist Quarterly 17 (1975). 
2. The trivialization of the harm women sustain by sexual abuse on the street is 
reflected in the lack of writing on the topic. 
It is now law, of course, that consent is not a defense to a discrimination action 
for sexual harassment. As every woman who has ever complained of harassment 
knows, however, the presumption that the harassment was in fact consensual is as 
difficult to dislodge, as is the belief that by virtue of that consent, it is permissible. See 
generally C. Mackinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Dis-
crimination (1979). See also B. Dziech and L. Weiner, The Lecherous Professor 
(1985), for a description of sexual harassment in schools, and the various ways in 
which universities and male professors characterize the harm as non-harm. 
The dismissal of the harm women sustain through unwanted marital sex as comi-
cal, is clearly reflected in our pop culture: think of the number of stand-up routines 
that explore the ridiculousness of the frigid or unwilling wife. Domestic violence as 
well is apparently regarded by many "decent folks" as humorous. Time reports: "'As 
a society,' says Sociologist Gelles of private violence, 'we laugh at this behavior' .... 
But indeed, such behavior is not so completely unthinkable that decent folks do not 
chuckle when 1ackie Gleason's Ralph Kramden angrily threatens to sock his ever-lov-
ing wife." Time, (Sept. 5, 1983). 
Freud, of course, has done more than any other individual to popularize the 
notion that incest is desired by the child rather than the parent. His reasons for 
insisting that this is so are the subject of popular debate. See 1. Masson, The Assault on 
Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory (1984) and]. Malcolm, In The 
Freud Archives (1984), and A. Miller, Thou Shalt Not Be Aware: Society's Betrayal Of 
The Child (1986). For a summary of more recent "experts" who have praised incest 
as desirable, liberating, consensual, and beneficial for all, and an account of the more 
subtle ways in which we all condone and encourage the sexual use of children, partic-
ularly girls, see E. Bass, In the Truth Itself There is Healing, included as introduction to 
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It is not so clear, though, why women's suffering is so pervasively 
dismissed or trivialized by legal culture, or more importantly what to 
do about it. As I will argue in a moment, feminist legal theorists do 
not typically frame the problem in the way I have just posed it. Never-
theless, it is not hard to construct two characteristic feminist explana-
tions of the phenomenon, and the strategies they entail. The "liberal-
legal feminist" would characterize the legal culture's discriminatory 
treatment of women's suffering as the reflection of a "perceptual er-
ror" committed by that culture. Women are in fact the same as-and 
therefore equal to-men, in the only sense which should matter to lib-
erallegal theory. Women, like men, are autonomous individuals who, 
if free to do so, will choose among proffered alternatives so as to fash-
ion their own "good life," and thereby create social value. However, 
the legal culture fails to see or acknowledge this central sameness-
and hence equality-of women and men. Because we are not perceived 
as identical to men in this way, we are not treated as such. Our 
choices are differentially restricted, and as a result we disproportion-
ately suffer. The liberal feminist's strategy is directly implied by her 
diagnosis: what we must do is prove that we are what we are-individu-
alists and egoists, as are men-and then fight for the equal rights and 
respect that sameness demands. Equal respect will in tum ensure, 
through the logic of formal justice and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, that our suffering will be alleviated by 
law-just as is men's suffering-through a liberating expansion of our 
opportunities for choice.3 
Bass and L. Thornton, I Never Told Anyone, Writings by Women Survivors of Child 
Sexual Abuse (1983). See generally F. Rush, The Best Kept Secret (1980). 
On the presumed inevitability of the pain of childbirth, see S. Firestone, The Dia-
lectic Of Sex: The Case For Feminist Revolution (1972). 
The privatization of domestic violence is eloquently expressed as well as docu-
mented in Prizzin's classic treatment, Scream Quietly Or The Neighbors Will Hear 
(1980). 
The explosion of derisive, dismissive and derogatory treatments of the recent 
Meese Commission report on pornography makes clear that the literate and con-
cerned public still does not understand, and perhaps does not want to understand, 
that pornography causes physical injury. For just one example of hundreds, see C. 
Vance, The Meese Commission on the Road, The Nation (August 2, 1986). 
Finally, the invisibility and incomprehensibility of marital rape is dramatically re-
flected in Time's 1983 report, ChildAbuse, Wife Beating and Rape. The only mention of 
marital rape occurs in the following passage: 
[mlost cases of private violence are closer calls. What to do about a man who rapes his 
wife? What about the fight between spouses that are not pat, villain-and-victim epi-
sodes? . .. One problem is that reasonable, well-intentioned people disagree (empha-
sis mine). 
On marital rape generally, see D. Russell, Rape In Marriage (1982). 
3. Because of her interest in the recent equal treatment/special treatment de-
bate, Wendy Williams has emerged as the spokesperson for classical, liberal-legal femi-
nism. See, e.g., Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special 
TreatmentDebate, 13 N.Y.D. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325 (1985); and Williams, TheEqual-
ity Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 Women's Rights L. Rptr. 
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The radical legal feminist's explanation of this phenomenon is 
also not hard to construct. The blanket dismissal of women's suffer-
ing by the male legal culture is not a reflection of a misperception. 
Indeed the larger culture's perception is accurate: women are not as 
autonomous or individualistic as men. The liberal is wrong to insist 
that women and men are equal in this way. The reason the legal cul-
ture tends to dismiss women's gender-specific sufferings is that women 
don't matter. Those in power ignore women's suffering because they 
don't care about the suffering of the disempowered. Hierarchical 
power imbalances do that to people-they make the disempowered 
less than human, and they make the empowered ruthless. The radical 
feminist's strategy follows directly from her diagnosis: what we must 
do is dismantle the hierarchy. The Equal Protection Clause-at least 
ifwe can interpret it (and use it) as an "Equality Promotion Clause"-
might help.4 
175 (1982). I do not, however, mean to imply that liberal-legal feminism aligns itself 
uniformly with the "equal treatment" prong of the pregnancy/workplace debate. On 
the contrary: because of their insistence upon the substantial similarity of men and 
women and their emphasis on the importance of expanding opportunities for wo-
men's choice so that they equal men's, I also regard those feminists who regard the 
pregnancy difference as the only difference between men and women, as liberal-legal-
ists. Thus, at least some, if not most, of the "special treatment" advocates are "liberal" 
and liberal-legalist in their overriding political and jurisprudential orientation. See 
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955 (1984); Kay, Equality and 
Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 Berkeley Jurisprudence, 56 Ind. LJ. 375 (1981). 
The pornography debate has also triggered a rebirth of liberal-legal feminism, or 
at least, a feminism which draws on, rather than distinguishes itself from, traditional 
liberal-legal commitments to individualism, freedom and autonomy. See, e.g., V. Bur-
styn (Ed.) Women Against Censorship (1985); Rubin, Sexual Politics, the New Right and 
the Sexual Fringe, 2 Leaping Lesbian (Feb. 1978); A. Snitow, C. Stansell and S. Thomp-
son (Eds.) Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality (1983) and C. Vance (Ed.) Plea-
sure And Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality (1985). 
For further elaborations of liberal-legal feminism beyond the contours of both 
the special treatment versus equal treatment debate and the "porn wars," see D. Kirp, 
M. Yudof & M. Franks, Gender Justice (1986); Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Prefer-
ential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 581 (1977); Freedman, 
Sex Equality, SexDifferences, and the Supreme Court, 92 Yale LJ. 913 (1983); Wildman, The 
Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 
Ore. L. Rev. 265 (1984) and Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the 
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1118 (1986) (part critique, partial 
endorsement of liberal-legal insistence on similarity and opportunities for choice.) 
4. See, e.g., Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Womens Subordination and the Rnle of 
Law, in Politics Of Law 117 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, 
Method and the State: An Agendafor Theory, 7 Signs 515 (1982); MacKinnon, Feminism, 
Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 Signs 304 (1986); Finley, 
Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 
Colum. L. Rev. 1118 (1986) (partial critique, partial endorsement, of radical legal 
feminist focus on gender hierarchy); Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An 
Essay, 95 Yale LJ. 1373 (1986), and Ruth Colker's contribution to this journal, Anti-
Subordination Above All Else. For an early articulation of some of the principles now 
basic to radical legalist analysis, see Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. 
And Public Affairs 107 (1976). 
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The recent explosion of feminist writings on the multitude of 
problems generated by women's "difference"5 prompts me to suggest 
a third explanation of this blanket dismissal by the legal culture of 
women's pain, and thus a third strategy. The blanket dismissal ofwo-
men's gender-specific suffering by the legal culture may be (partly) a 
reflection of the extent to which the pain women feel is not understood, 
and that it is not understood may be because it is itself different, and 
not just a product of our difference. Thus, it may be that women suf-
fer more because we suffer differently. The pain we feel is itself differ-
ent (as are our pleasures). (Is there anything quite like the pain of 
childbirth?) If this is right, then the legal culture has committed a 
perceptual error, but the error is not, as the liberal feminist believes, 
in perceiving us as different where we in fact are the same. The 
perceptual error is in failing to understand the difference-not the 
sameness-of our subjective, hedonic lives. If the pain women feel is 
in fact discontinuous from-different than-what is experienced by 
men, then it is not really surprising that the injuries we sustain are 
trivialized or dismissed by the larger male culture. It is hard to em-
pathize with the pain of another, when the nature of that pain is not 
understood. If the pain women feel is different-not shared by 
men-then it is not surprising that men cannot readily empathize 
with women who suffer, much less share in the effort to resist the 
source of their injuries. The strategic inference I draw is this: if we 
want to enlist the aid of the larger legal culture, the feel of our gen-
der-specific pain must be described before we can ever hope to com-
municate its magnitude. 
Focus on the "difference" of our hedonic lives also suggests a dif-
ferent 'way to address the related problem of "false consciousness." As 
feminists know all too well, it is not just the legal culture which trivial-
izes women's suffering, women do so also. Again, if we focus on the 
distinctiveness of our pain, this becomes less surprising. An injury 
uniquely sustained by a disempowered group will lack a name, a his-
tory, and in general a linguistic reality. Consequently, the victim as 
well as the perpetrator will transform the pain into something else, such 
as, for example, punishment, or flattery, or transcendence, or uncon-
scious pleasure. A victim's response to an iryury which is perceived by 
the victim as deservedly punitive, consensual, natural, subconsciously 
desired, legally inevitable, or trivial "will be very different from a re-
sponse to an injury which is perceived as simply painful. We change 
our behavior in response to the threat of what we perceive as punish-
5. See, e.g., The Future of Difference, H. Eisenstein and A. Jardine, eds. (1984). 
The classic works are C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1980) and N. Chodorow, The 
Reproduction of Mothering (1979). In the legal context, see, e.g., Scales, Towards a 
FeministJurisprudence, 56 Indiana LJ. 375 (1981); Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differ-
ences, and the Supreme Court, 92 Yale LJ. 913 (1983); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Consti-
tution, 132 Pennsylvania L. Rev. 955 (1984) and, of course, the rest of the submissions 
to this journal. 
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ment; we diminish ourselves in response to injuries we perceive as triv-
ial; we reconstruct our pasts in response to injuries we perceive as 
subconsciously desired; we negate our inner selves in response to inju-
ries we perceive as consensual and we constrain our potentiality in 
response to injuries we perceive as inevitable. We respond to pain, on 
the other hand, by resisting the source of the pain. The strategic in-
ference should be clear: we must give voice to the hurting self, even 
when that hurting self sounds like a child rather than an adult; even 
when that hurting self voices "trivial" complaints; even when the hurt-
ing self is ambivalent toward the harm and even when (especially 
when) the hurting self is talking a language not heard in public dis-
course. Only by so doing will we ourselves become aware of the mean-
ing of the suffering in our lives, and its contingency in our history. 
Only when we understand the contingency of that pain, will we be free 
to address it and change the conditions which cause it through legal 
tools. 
If my argument is correct, then it would seem that feminist legal 
theorists should be hard at work providing rich descriptions of wo-
men's subjective, hedonic lives, particularly the pain in those lives, 
and more particularly the pain in our lives which is different. And yet 
we aren't, by which I mean, feminist legal theorists aren't. Feminists, by 
contrast, are, as are feminist lawyers. But feminist legal theorists, I be-
lieve, are dangerously neglecting the phenomenological, subjective, 
and hedonic distinctiveness of women's lives, and the relevance of this 
aspect of our difference to legal criticism. I can think of four possible 
reasons for this neglect. The first three are problems which plague 
discussion of all aspects of our difference. The fourth reason is philo-
sophical, and is the subject of this essay. 
The first reason is linguistic. It is hard to talk about our pain and 
pleasure, and it is hard to talk about our pai~ and pleasure because 
they are different. Our language is inadequate to the task. As women 
become more powerful, this linguistic barrier is eased: we now possess, 
for example, the legal and social labels that at least identify some of 
our experiences as injurious, such as "sexual harassment" and "date-
rape." But we still lack the descriptive vocabulary necessary to convey 
the quality of the pain we sustain by virtue of these experiences. The 
second reason is psychological. Before we can convince others of the 
seriousness of the injuries we sustain, we must first convince ourselves, 
and so long as others are unconvinced, to some extent, we will be as 
well. This is a circle that must be broken, not inhabited. The third 
and underlying problem is political. The inadequacy of language and 
the problem of "false consciousness" are but reflections of what is 
surely the core obstacle to the development of feminist discourse on 
the nature of gender-specific pain, which is an unwilling and resisting 
audience. When we struggle to find the words to describe the pain 
(or pleasure) in our lives, and the effort is rewarded with dismissal 
and trivialization, the fully human response is to silence ourselves. 
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However, at least one reason-and perhaps the main reason-
that feminist legal theorists have neglected the hedonic dimension of 
our difference-and the subject of this article-is not the difference 
problem, but the emerging logic of feminist legal theory itself. By 
virtue of the models of legal criticism that feminist legal theorists have 
embraced, we've literally defined the subjective, hedonic aspect of our 
differences out of existence. Unlike feminist political theorists, femi-
nist legal theorists have followed largely derivative normative strate-
gies.6 That is, feminist legal theorists have adopted nonjeminist 
normative models of legal criticism, and then applied those models to 
women's problems. I have no objection to this strategy: there is no 
reason that feminist legal theorists should aim for relentless original-
ity. I do object, though, to the particular models feminist legal theo-
rists have adopted. The two major normative models of legal criticism 
which feminist legal theorists have thus far embraced-liberal legal-
ism and radical legalism-themselves deny the normative significance 
of the subjective pleasure and suffering of our lives. Because of the 
normative models employed by modem legal feminists, the internal, 
phenomenological reality of women's hedonic lives-and its differ-
ence from men's-has become virtually irrelevant to feminist legal 
theory. 
Thus, I will argue that liberal-legal feminist theorists-true to their 
liberalism-'want women to have more choices, and that radical-legal 
feminist theorists-true to their radicalism-want women to have 
more power. Both models direct our critical attention outward-liber-
alism to the number of choices we have, radicalism to the amount of 
power. Neither model oflegal criticism, and therefore, derivatively, of 
feminist legal criticism, posits subjective happiness as the direct goal 
of legal reform, or subjective suffering as the direct evil to be eradi-
cated. Neither model directs our critical attention inward. Conse-
quently, and unsurprisingly, neither liberal nor radical feminist legal 
critics have committed themselves to the task of determining the mea-
sure of women's happiness or suffering. 
Which is not to say that liberal and radical feminist legal theorists 
are unconcerned about women's subjective well-being. Rather, each 
group dismisses the normative significance of women's pain and suf-
fering because of the essentially strategic choices made by the underly-
ing (nonfeminist) politics embraced by that group, and the depictions 
of human nature those choices entaiL That is, :radicals, liberals and 
6. See generally A Jagger, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (1983) for a discus-
sion of the relation betw'een liberal feminism and liberalism, radical feminism and 
radicalism, socialist feminism and socialism, and marxist feminism and marxism. 
Feminists who write from a "difference" perspective, and who are generally criti-
cal of an "equality" approach to women's liberation both legal and othenvise, tend to 
note that the equality discourse employed by both liberal and radical feminist legal 
theory is "borrowed." See, e.g., Note (Prof. Christine Littleton), Toward a ReMjinition of 
Sexual Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 487 (1981); and Finley, supra n. 4. 
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feminists all have great concern for people's subjective happiness. But 
neither radical nor liberal legalism-nor their feminist derivatives-
aim for happiness or well-being directly. Instead, they both assert a 
definition of the human being which in tum assumes a correlation 
between some condition of the objective world and a subjective state 
of well-being and then aim to maximize that objective, external condi-
tion. Thus, definitionally, liberal legalism assumes that, if free to do 
so, people will choose what will make them happy, and that therefore 
there exists a correlation between the objective act of consent and a 
subjective gain in happiness. On this assumption, liberal legalists seek 
to maximize not our subjective happiness, but our objective opportu-
nities for choice.7 Radical legalism assumes that there exists a correla-
tion between people's objective equality and subjective happiness, or 
well-being. On this assumption, radicals seek to maximize not our 
subjective happiness, but our objective equality.s In each case, the 
correlation between objective, external condition and subjective, in-
ternal, hedonic state is a function of the definition of the "human" to 
which each tradition is committed. Both models share a refusal to 
inquire into whether their assumed correlation between objective con-
dition and subjective well-being is true or false of contingent, embod-
ied human beings. Therefore, both models methodologically 
preclude, on their own terms, feminist inquiry into whether the ac-
count of the human being that the model assumes is a true account of 
women. And finally, they both direct the feminists that embrace them 
away from an investigation of the differences of women's internal, he-
donic lives. 
The cost to women of feminist legal theorists' endorsement of the 
anti-phenomenological methodology9 and anti-hedonic norms10 of 
7. The commitment to personal choice reappears in different forms all over the 
political spectrum that falls under liberal legalism's umbrella. See as an example from 
the liberal left, Dworkin, Liberalism, republished in R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 
181 (1985) and for an example from the right, see R. Posner, The Economics of Jus-
tice (1982). See also generally West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the 
Liberal Vision, 46 Pittsburgh L. Rev. 673 (1985), West, Authority, Autonomy and Choice: 
The IWle of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 
HaIV. L. Rev. 384 (1985) and West, Submission Choice and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge 
Posner, 99 HaIV. L. Rev. 1449 (1986). 
8. Whatever else they may be, and whatever inconsistencies divide them, radical 
legalists are anti-hierarchical, seemingly regardless of the hierarchy in question. The 
best statement, I believe, of this commitment is found in Roberto Unger's much 
maligned but well-reasoned exposition of the Critical Legal Studies movement, Un-
ger, Critical Legal Studies, 96 HaIV. L. Rev. 563 (1982). 
9. I will happily abandon this awkward phrase, if there is a better one. I mean 
simply that liberal and radical theory refuse to test their assumptions regarding our 
nature against the evidence of our phenomenal perceptions. I am not claiming that 
desires, motivations, or experience of pleasure and pain are not socially constructed, 
or that perceptions of them are in some way pure. But it does not follow that hedonic 
lives don't exist, or, just as bad, that they cannot be falsely characterized, or that they 
are infinitely malleable. 
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the models they endorse is very high. It renders liberal and radical 
feminist legal theorists peculiarly uncritical-as feminists-of the vi-
sions of the human and thus of the normative assumptions of the 
models for legal criticism which they have respectively embraced. The 
anti-phenomenological methodology of radicalism and liberalism rule 
out the only inquiry which could conceivably determine the value to 
women of the model itself, and that is whether the description of the 
human which each model embraces is true of women. Thus, liberal 
feminists fail to ask-by virtue of the intrinsic commitments of liberalism-
whether the liberal conception of the phenomenology of choice is 
true of women ~ experience. As a result liberal feminist legal theorists 
cannot even ask the question which as feminists they should start with, 
and that is whether the liberalism they embrace will be of any value to 
women. Radical feminists fail to ask-by virtue of the intrinsic commit-
ments of radicalism-whether the radical commitment to the ideal of 
equality resonates with women's felt desires. As a result, radical femi-
nist legal theorists cannot even ask the question which as feminists 
they should start with, and that is whether the radical ideal of equality 
is desirable for women. It is only by focusing directly on what both 
models definitionally exclude-our phenomenological, hedonic ex-
perience-that we will be able to ask these questions. And it is only by 
asking these questions that we will determine the limits of liberal and 
radical models of legal criticism and reform, and it is only by under-
standing those limits that we will understand where a truly feminist 
model of legal criticism must begin. 
Part One of this article provides a phenomenological and he-
donic critique of the conception of the human-and thus the fe-
male-that underlies liberal legal feminism. Part Two presents a 
phenomenological critique of the conception of the human-and 
thus the female-which underlies radical feminist legal criticism. 
Again, I will argue that in both cases the theory does not pay enough 
attention to feminism: liberal feminist legal theory owes more to liber-
alism than to feminism and radical feminist legal theory owes more to 
radicalism than it does to feminism. Both models accept a depiction 
of human nature which is simply untrue of women. Thus, both ac-
cept, uncritically, a claimed correlation between objective condition 
10. Although feminist legalists have apparently embraced the mainstream twenti-
eth century resistance to ethical hedonism, the ethical theory that asserts pleasure as 
the good toward which we ought aim, and pain as the evil we should eradicate, some 
feminists, notably Marilyn French, are leaning toward an explicit endorsement of he-
donism. See M. French, Beyond Power (1985). The "female voice" that Gilligan de-
scribes in In A Different Voice supra n.5 also beats strong resemblance to the classical 
hedonist's voice, undoubtedly muted in this century, but very loud, and very male, in 
the writings of the classical ethical hedonists. See C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice, 
supra n.5. A small but growing number of feminists have noted the hostility of the 
deontological tradition to feminist concerns, and have for that reason endorsed he-
donism, its traditional contender. See, e.g., R. Lake, The Metaethical Framework of Anti-
Abortion Rhetoric, 11 Signs (Summer 1985). 
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and subjective reality, which, I will argue, is untrue to women. As a 
result, both groups fail to address the distinctive quality of women's 
subjective, hedonic lives, and the theories they have generated there-
fore have the potential to backfire-badly-against women's true 
interests. 
In the concluding section I will suggest an alternative normative 
model for feminist legal criticism which aims neither for choice nor 
equality, but directly for women's happiness, and a feminist legal the-
ory which has as its critical focus the felt experience of women's sub-
jective, hedonic lives. My substantive claim is that women's happiness 
or pleasure-as opposed to women's freedom or equality-should be 
the ideal toward which feminist legal criticism and reform should be 
pressed, and that women's misery, suffering and pain-as opposed to 
women's oppression or subordination-is the evil we should resist. I 
will argue that feminist legal theorists, in short, have paid too much 
attention to the ideals of equality and autonomy and not enough at-
tention to the hedonistic ideals of happiness and pleasure, and that 
correlatively we have paid too much attention to the evils of subordi-
nation and oppression, and not enough attention to the hedonistic 
evils of suffering and pain. My methodological assumption is that the 
key to moral decision-making lies in our capacity to empathize with 
the pain of others, and thereby resist the source of it, and not in our 
capacity for abstraction, generalization, or reason. My strategic claim 
is directly entailed: the major obstacle to achieving the empathic un-
derstanding which is the key to significant moral commitment, includ-
ing the commitment of the legal system to address the causes of 
women's suffering, is the striking difference between women's and 
men's internal lives, and more specifically, the different quality of our 
joys and sorrows. This obstacle can only be overcome through rich 
description of our internal hedonic lives. 
Much of my argument will proceed by way of narrative and anec-
dote, for two reasons. First, it is, I believe, the only way to express the 
different quality of women's hedonic lives. But second, narrative is 
emerging as a feminist method of moral argument, both in practice 
and theory. The divergence maps another aspect of our difference: 
women just do rely on narrative, anecdote and story more than do 
men for purposes of making moral arguments. ll Women in legal 
academia can and typically have bridged the gulf that consequently 
separates us from male discourse by assimilating. However, particu-
larly as our numbers increase, we should begin to respond to the gap 
by bringing women's speech, voice and method into the dialogue. I 
think-I'm sure-that we should do both. But since thus far we've 
done only the former, I urge some dialectic affirmative action. We 
must begin to make good on our promise to change the discourse 
11. See C. Gilligan, supra n.5. 
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with our presence, instead of simply changing ourselves to fit the 
discourse. 
1. LmERAL FEMINISM: CONSENT, AUTONOMY AND THE GIVING SELF 
Perhaps the most widely held normative commitment of main-
stream liberal legal theorists is that individuals should be free to 
choose their own style of life, and to exercise that freedom of choice 
in as many spheres as possible-economic, political and personal.12 
The conception of the human and the relation between the individual 
and the state which implicitly motivates this commitment is relatively 
straightforward. According to the liberal vision, value is produced in 
our social world through satiation of the subjective desires and prefer-
ences of the individual. That satiation is in turn manifested and facili-
tated through the individual's voluntary choices. The individual's 
choice 'will reflect that individual's judgment of what will best satisfy 
that individual's own desires. It follows that whatever is freely con-
sented to by an individual is what is good for that individual, and, if 
free of adverse effects on others, is good for society. The way to maxi-
mize value in the social world is therefore to maximize the opportuni-
ties for the exercise of choice through voluntary transactions betvveen 
individuals. A law which either facilitates or mimics consensual trans-
actions between freely choosing individuals is a good law on this 
model, while a law which frustrates such transactions is a bad law. In-
dividual freedom is the ideal toward which law and legal reform ought 
press, and coercion or restraint on freedom is the evil.13 
The contribution of feminist liberal legalism has been to extend 
the umbrella of this normative vision to women as well as men.14 The 
liberal legal feminist insists that the depiction of the human embraced 
by liberal legalism-which I will sometimes refer to as the "liberal 
self'-is also true of women, and that therefore the relationship of the 
state to the individual must be the same for both women and men. 
What it means for women to be equal to men in the liberal feminist 
12. See, e.g., Dworkin, Liberalism, supra n.7; Posner, supra n.7, and B. Ackerman, 
Social Justice in the Liberal State (1978). 
13. The legal economists' articulation of this thesis is often clearer than main-
stream legal liberal articulation. Posner's is perhaps the clearest. See R. Posner, supra, 
n.7; Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193, 1197-99 
(1985); Posner & Landes, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1978) 
and Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1431 (1986). 
14. For an excellent discussion ofliberal feminism, see A Jagger, Feminist Politics 
and Human Nature, 27-49 (1983). By "feminist liberal legalism," I have in mind a 
characteristic way of thinking about the relation of women to legal theory, not a par-
ticular individual. In fact, to my knowledge, no liberal feminist thinker conversant 
with legal theory has spelled out sympathetically what the tenets of feminist liberal 
legalism would be. In spite of this gap, though, feminist liberal legalism as I have 
characterized it in the text, dominates the way most legalists-feminists, non-feminists 
and even perhaps some anti-feminists-think about women and law. 
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vision is basically that women and men are the same in the only sense 
that matters to the liberal legalist: women as well as men create value 
by satiating their subjective desires through consensual choices. Be-
cause women and men are equal in this way-because they share the 
same definitive human attribute-women should be equally free to 
choose their own life plans, and women should be equally entitled to 
the respect from the state that that freedom requires. 
The liberal feminist legal strategy for dealing with women's suf-
fering is directly entailed by her liberalism. Women, like men, con-
sent to that which will minimize their own suffering and maximize 
their own felt happiness. Therefore, the way to deal with women's 
suffering is to increase women's sphere of consensual freedom. What 
we should do with law, then, is insure that women's sphere of consen-
sual freedom is as large as possible, or at least as large as men's. Thus, 
the liberal feminist's central jurisprudential commitment tracks the 
liberal's: a law is a good law if it increases the freedom of women to 
enter into consensual transactions or if it equalizes that freedom with 
that enjoyed by men. A law is a bad law if it decreases that freedom.15 
Liberal feminist legal theory carries with it the same problems 
which now plague liberal legalism, but multiplied. Modern liberal 
legal feminists, like modern liberals generally, have failed to examine 
the essentially descriptive claims about the human being that underlie 
their normative model. The liberal claim that human beings consent 
to transactions in order to maximize their welfare may be false. If it is, 
then the liberal claim that social value is created through facilitating 
choice will be false as well.16 But furthermore, women may be "differ-
ent" in precisely the way which would render the empirical assump-
tions regarding human motivation which underlie the liberal's 
commitment to the ethics of consent more false for women than for men. 
Thus, it may be that women generally don't consent to changes so as to 
increase our own pleasure or satisfy our own desires. It may be that 
women consent to changes so as to increase the pleasure or satisfy the 
desires of others. The descriptive account of the phenomenology of 
choice that underlies the liberal's conceptual defense of the moral 
primacy of consent may be wildly at odds with the way women phe-
nomenologically experience the act of consent. If it is-if women 
"consent" to transactions not to increase our own welfare, but to in-
crease the welfare of others-if women are "different" in this psycho-
logical way-then the liberal's ethic of consent, with its presumption 
of an essentially selfish human (male) actor and an essentially selfish 
consensual act, when even-handedly applied to both genders, will 
have disastrous implications for women. For if women consent to 
15. Thus, the liberal feminist tendency to cast arguments in terms of women's 
freedom. The "pro-choia!' rhetoric of the liberal abortion campaign is the best 
example. 
16. For two critiques of mainstream liberal legalism on this score, see West, supra 
n.7; and Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 769. 
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changes so as to increase the happiness of others rather than to in-
crease our own happiness, then the ethic of consent, applied even-
handedly, may indeed increase the amount of happiness in the world, 
but women will not be the beneficiaries. 
And indeed, the liberal ethic of consent does, oftentimes, have 
less than happy consequences for women. The magnitude of the dis-
service should be obvious to anyone who can resist the staggeringly 
seductive liberal urge to imply an increase in subjective happiness 
from the objective act of consent. The rather inescapable fact is that 
much of the misery women endure is fully "consensual." That is, 
much of women's suffering is a product of a state of being which was 
itself brought into being thrQugh a transaction to which women un-
questionably tendered consent. A woman's experience of marital sex-
uality, for example, may range from boring to irritating to invasive to 
intensely painful. Similarly, a female employee may experience the 
sexual advances of an employer as degrading. But the fact is that 
neither the wife nor the employee was brought to the altar in shackles 
or place of employment in chains.17 Put affirmatively, the conditions 
which create our misery-unwanted pregnancies, violent and abusive 
marriages, sexual harassment on the job-are often traceable to acts 
of consent. Women-somewhat uniquely-consent to their misery. 
An ethical standard which ties value to the act of consent by presump-
tively assuming that people consent to their circumstances so as to 
bring about their own happiness-and by so doing thereby create 
value-leaves these miserable consensual relationships beyond 
criticism. 
The liberal legal feminist, to the extent she is a liberal legalist, 
is-must be-deaf to the above claim. For the liberal legal feminist, 
women and men are the same on the only dimension that should be of 
concern to law: women and men both create value through their indi-
vidual and presumptively selfish choices. This is the empirical equal-
ity-meaning identity or sameness-behind the liberal legal feminist's 
normative commitment to equal freedom and equal respect. Reflect-
ing a not-necessarily-admirable respect for the virtue of consistency, 
liberal feminists must and do simply deny the extent to which women 
consent to their sufferance of misery. For the liberal and for the lib-
eral feminist as well, it just can't be. 
A. A Phenomenological Critique of Liberal Feminism 
I want to suggest in this section that many women, much of the 
time, consent to transactions, changes, or situations in the world so as 
17. I do not mean to deny-indeed I mean to highlight-the extent to which the 
choices we make occur within a context of compulsory heterosexuality. But that does 
not negate the fact that within that context these choices are relatively unfettered. If we 
are going to address the causes of our misery, then, we must attack the context, not the 
choices themselves, for signs of bondage. 
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to satisfy not their own desires or to maximize their own pleasure, as 
liberal legalism and liberal legal feminism both presume, but to maxi-
mize the pleasure and satiate the desires of others, and that they do so 
by virtue of conditions which only women experience. 1 will some-
times call the cluster of "other-regarding," other-pleasing motivations 
that rule these women's actions the "giving self," so as to distinguish it 
from the "liberal self': the cluster of self-regarding "rational" motiva-
tions presumed by liberal legalism. Thus my descriptive claim is that 
many women much of the time are giving selves rather than liberal 
selves. If we take the liberal's description of the motivational core of 
the human being as accurate and central, then this motivational dif-
ference between most men and many women implies that women who 
define themselves as "giving selves" are not human. 
1 believe that women become giving rather than liberal selves for 
a range of reasons-including our (biological) pregnability and our 
(social) training for our role as primary caretakers18-but in this sec-
tion, 1 will focus on only one causal hypothesis, which (I think) has 
great explanatory force. The causal hypothesis is this: women's lives 
are dangerous, and it is the acquisitive and potentially violent nature 
of male sexuality which is the cause of the danger. A fully justified 
fear of acquisitive and violent male sexuality consequently permeates 
many women's-perhaps all women's-sexual and emotional self-def-
inition. Women respond to this fear by re-constituting themselves in a 
way that controls the danger and suppresses the fear. Thus: women 
define themselves as "giving selves" so as to obviate the threat, the 
danger, the pain, and the fear of being self-regarding selves from 
whom their sexuality is taken. 
The danger, and hence the fear, that women live with is very hard 
for others (men) to acknowledge or understand for two reasons. 
First, both the objective danger and the subjective fear are "different." 
The danger and the endangered fear are pervasive rather than spo-
radic conditions of our lives. There is a world of difference between 
the threat of sporadic violence (with which men are imminently famil-
iar, from barroom brawls to wars), and hence sporadic fear, and a 
threat of pervasive violence, and hence definitional fear. One responds 
to sporadic fear and the threat of sporadic violence by changing one's 
behavior. One moves to a safer neighborhood, one fights back, one 
runs away, one cowers, or whatever, but one knows that the barroom 
brawl, the mugging, or the war will be over, and that when it is over, 
the state of normalcy-safety-will return. By contrast, one responds 
to pervasive fear and pervasive threat not by changing one's behavior, 
but by re-defining oneself. Women cannot eliminate the danger our sex-
uality poses by moving to a safer neighborhood, any more than blacks 
can respond to the danger their color poses by moving to a safer race. 
18. See N. Chodorow, supra n.5, and D. Dinnerstein, The Mermaid And The Min-
otaur: Sexual Arrangements And Human Malaise (1977). 
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Nor will the danger cease when the war ends. We respond to the per-
vasive threat of violent and acquisitive male sexuality instead by chang-
ing ourselves, rather than responding to the conditions which cause it. 
The danger, the violence, and the fear with which women live 
and which informs our self-definition are invisible, which is the sec-
ond reason they are misunderstood. They are not a part of men's 
world, externally or internally. They are obviously not a part of their 
internal world: men, unlike women, do not experience the fear of vio-
lent sexuality as a part of their self-definition. They will not, because 
they cannot, understand the kind of defining fear with which women 
live by reference to shared experience. Furthermore, women's defini-
tional fear is not a part of their external world: the danger and the 
threat that causes it are largely-to them-invisible. Left and liberal 
men do not see women shake with fear. They do not see women get-
ting harassed on the street; when men accompany women, as all wo-
men know, harassment stops. For the same reason, they do not see 
women sexually harassed at work. They do not see women battered in 
the home. They do not see women being raped, by strangers, dates or 
husbands. They do not see women violated, abused and afraid. To 
these men, violence against women, the pain women feel as a result of 
it, and the fear of its recurrence, are invisible. It is not surprising that 
the claim that women's lives are ruled by fear is heard by these men as 
wildly implausible. They see no evidence in their own lives to support 
it. This simple fact, more than anything else, I believe, commits wo-
men and men to live in two separate realities. 
This invisibility and the ignorance it produces is almost as damag-
ing as the fear itself. It has several manifestations, every one of which 
now constitutes a serious stumbling block for feminist progress. One 
manifestation, for example, is the male reaction to the increasing visi-
bility of the problem. .As anyone who reads Newsweek knows, the 
amount of violence in women's lives is not just higher, but much 
higher, than has until very recently generally been thought. Surely it's 
fair to say that the percentage of women who have been violently (and 
privately) abused at some point in their lives is higher than most men 
and therefore higher than most of "us" used to believe. The probable 
incidence of sexual abuse of young girls is not ".02 percent," as it was 
comfortably thought until very recently, it is far higher.19 The prob-
able incidence of wife abuse is not .1 percent, (did anyone ever really 
think that?) it is far higher.20 Here's a "sex difference" I've noticed: 
When women see these newly reported high percentages, they are 
19. In Russell, The Secret Trauma: Incest In The Lives Of Girls And Women 394 
(1986) the author puts the level of incest at 16 percent. In Russell, The Incidence and 
Prevalence of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse of Female Children, 7 Child Abuse 
& Neglect 137 (1983) she puts the amount of child sexual abuse, familial and extra-
familial, at 38 percent. 
20. The amount of "private violence" in any society is by definition not known. 
Time magazine put the point this way: 
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outraged at the violence, and when men see the same numbers they 
are outraged at what they perceive as "unethical" and wild inflation of 
statistics. I find this sex difference profoundly disturbing. 
[What is the logic revealed by the skeptical insistence that 
"although I haven't done the research myself, these numbers just 
can't' be right?" Why can't they be? To provide a comparative per-
spective: I haven't done the research either, and my own reaction, 
(equally "ignorant") when I look at those same high numbers, is that 
they are deflated, not inflated. My "guess" is that the actual incidence 
of, say, child/wife abuse is higher than the highest estimates I've yet 
seen. Why is my reaction so different? I attribute it to this: my reality-
both internal and external-includes that violence, the pain it causes, 
and the fear it engenders. Not only have I lived it (and they haven't), 
but I talk to women (and they don't), and women talk to me (and not 
them). Like all women I know, I hear narratives of violence which are 
not heard by any man with the sometimes exception of male ther-
apists. My male colleagues think my neighborhood is safe; they 
weren't told (I was) the details of a recent rape. I hear about the date 
rapes of students (more often, these days, attempted date rapes); my 
male colleagues do not. The story is always prefaced by, "Don't tell 
anyone." I hear (men don't) about marital violence. It is always pref-
aced by: "Don't tell anyone; he'd kill me" (which might be true) or 
"don't tell anyone, he'd lose his job" (which is hardly ever true) or 
"don't tell anyone, I'd be ashamed" (which is always true). I hearwo-
men's memories of early sexual abuse. "Don't tell anyone." I draw 
this simple inference: Women and men have wildly different "igno-
rant" intuitions about the amount of danger, violence and fear in wo-
[W]hen statisticians tum to private violence, the numbers become iffy, ap-
proximate in the extreme. Are there 650,000 cases of child abuse annually, 
or a million? Or 6 million? Bona fide experts, extrapolating and just guess-
ing, variously cite all those figures and others. It is said that every year two 
million women are beaten by their husbands, and it is also said that nearly 
six million are. Pick your figure. A Justice Department survey counted 
178,000 rapes during 1981, but for every woman who reported a rape to the 
police, perhaps nine or maybe 25 did not. It is beyond dispute, however, 
that extraordinary numbers of women and children are being brutalized by 
those closest to them. Time, p. 19 (Sept. 5, 1983). 
The editors of Sisterhood Is Global elaborate: 
Approximately 2 million to 6 million women each year are beaten by the 
men they live with or are married to; 50-70% of wives experience battery 
during their marriages; 2000-4000 women are beaten to death by husbands 
each year; in 1979 40% of all women who were killed were murdered by 
their partners ... 25% of women's suicide attempts follow a history of bat-
tery; wife battery injures more U.S. women than auto accidents, rape or mug-
gings; every 18 seconds a woman is beaten by her husband severely enough 
to require hospitalization. Police spend 1/3 to 1/2 of their time responding 
to domestic violence calls; 97% of spouse abuse is directed against wives. 
Battery is a cross-class, cross-race problem. 
R. Morgan, (ed.) Sisterhood Is Global 704 (1984). 
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men's lives because women live it and men don't and women tell other 
women and not men. The strategic implication is this: Women should 
start telling their stories, out loud, in public, in whatever voice, dialect 
or register fits the occasion.] 
How does a pervasive and largely invisible danger, and an equally 
pervasive and invisible fear, affect women's lives? Women cannot, and 
do not live in a state of constant fear of male sexual violence any more 
than workers can live in a state of constant fear of material depriva-
tion. One way (there are others) that women control the danger-
and thus suppress the fear-is by redefining themselves as "giving 
selves." Most simply, a woman will define herself as a "giving self' so 
that she will not be violated. She defines herself as a being who 
"gives" sex, so that she will not become a being from whom sex is taken. 
In a deep sense (too deep: she tends to forget it), this transformation 
is consensual: she "consents" to being a "giving self'-the dependent 
party in a comparatively protective relationship-for self-regarding 
liberal reasons; she consents in order to control the danger both in-
side and outside of the relationship, and in order to suppress the fear 
that danger engenders. Once redefined, however, and once within 
those institutions that support the definition, she becomes a person 
who gives her consent so as to ensure the other's happiness (not her own), 
so as to satiate the other's desires (not her own), so as to promote the 
other's well-being (not her own), and ultimately so as to obey the other's 
commands. In other words, she embraces a self-definition and a motive 
for acting which is the direct antithesis of the internal motivational 
life presupposed by liberalism. The motivation of her consensual acts 
is the satisfaction of another's desires. She consents to serve the needs 
and satiate the desires of others. 
I have no interest in arguing that all women are giving selves all 
of the time. I want to suggest in the next few subsections that enough 
women have lived with enough fear and danger in their lives as to 
justify the inference that significant numbers of women have defined 
themselves in a way that undercuts the commitment to the ethical pri-
macy of consent which underlies liberal feminist legal theory. In the 
following sections I will describe some of the life environments that 
render such a self-definition plausible. I will discuss only those envi-
ronments in which I have lived. Thus, the descriptions that follow are 
exemplary of the types of fear which have at some point in my life 
determined my self-definition. Toward that end, I will discuss the ef-
fect of domestic violence, promiscuous and threatening heterosexual-
ity, and the fear of rape and street hassling on a woman's self-
definition. The list is obviously not exhaustive; it excludes, because I 
have not myself lived through it and do not fully understand it, how 
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stranger-rape itse1f21 (instead of the fear of it) and incest affects a wo-
man's self-perception.22 
1. Abusive Domestic Relationships: Fear and Consent 
Del Martin begins her book Battered Wives23 with the following 
Letter from a Battered Wife: 
I am in my thirties and so is my husband. I have a high school 
diploma and am presently attending a local college, trying to obtain 
the additional education I need. My husband is a college graduate 
and a professional in his field. We are both attractive and . . . 
respected and well-liked. We have four children and live in a mid-
dle-class home with all the comforts we could possibly want. 
I have everything except life without fear. 
For most of my married life I have been periodically beaten by my 
husband. What do I mean by "beaten"? I mean that parts of my 
body have been hit violently and repeatedly, and that painful 
bruises, swelling, bleeding wounds, unconsciousness [sic], and com-
binations of these things have resulted. 
I have had glasses thrown at me. I have been kicked in the abdo-
men when I was visibly pregnant. I have been kicked off the bed 
and hit while lying on the floor-again, while I was pregnant. I 
have been whipped, kicked and thrown, picked up again and 
thrown down again. I have been punched and kicked in the head, 
chest, face and abdomen more times than I can count. 
Few people have ever seen my black and blue face or swollen lips 
because I have always stayed indoors afterwards, feeling ashamed. I 
was never able to drive following one of these beatings, so I could 
not get myself to a hospital for care. I could never have left my 
young children alone, even if I could have driven a car. 
Being beaten is a terrible thing; it is most terrible of all if you are 
not equipped to fight back. I recall an occasion when I tried to 
defend myself and actually tore my husband's shirt. Later, he 
showed it to a relative as proof that I had done something wrong. 
The fact that at that moment I had several raised spots on my head 
hidden by my hair, a swollen lip that was bleeding, and a severely 
damaged cheek with a blood clot that caused a permanent dimple 
didn't matter to him. What mattered was that I tore his shirt! That 
I tore it in self-defense didn't mean anything to him. 
My situation is so untenable I would guess that anyone who has not exper-
ienced one like it would find it incomprehensible. I find it difficult to believe 
myself.24 
21. The best description to my knowledge is in Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims' 
Rights 37 Stanford L. Review 953-66 (1985). 
22. For powerful descriptions, see E. Bass & L. Thornton (Eds.) supra n.2. 
23. D. Martin, Battered Wives (1984). 
24. Id. at 2-3. 
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How do women respond to the total fear that accompanies the 
daily violence that characterizes an abusive domestic relationship? 
What does such fear teach you? A woman cannot live in a state of 
terror every day and what a battered woman learns in an abusive mar-
riage is how to define herself in such a way that she can on occasion 
suppress the fear. Thus, what a violent intimate relationship taught 
me was to live for the other. I was-as these things go-relatively lucky, 
by which I mean the abuse I sustained was not nearly so extreme as 
that suffered by the woman quoted above. But I did learn in this rela-
tively lucky environment of fists, slaps, bruises, threats, glares and ter-
ror the lesson of daily fear. Daily fear taught me to define myself as an 
object, the purpose of which was to buffer-and silence-another's 
violence. My purpose-my only reason for acting and my only motiva-
tion-was to serve that need of another. Fear taught me to view as 
literally incongruous the mere suggestion that I should expect to reap 
pleasure for myself from anything at all; surely not from sex, but nor 
from more ordinary sources, such as food, flowers, music, friendship 
or scenery. The notion that I would act-or consent-so as to further 
my own welfare or to create pleasure for myself was both inconceiv-
able and unconceived: until circumstances and self-preservatory 
desperation inspired my exit, it never crossed my mind. Pleasures 
were for others. Sensuality was for others. "Personal welfare" was for 
others. Subjectivity was for others. I did not have, much less act on, 
preferences. I learned to view this as both natural and as naturally 
inarticulable, meaning I learned not just to lie, but to be a lie, to em-
body lying, to have no entitlement to either truth or language. I 
learned to be for another's violence and to view it as my reason for being, 
and I learned not to think about it much. 
[Should I talk about this? Is it shameful? Could he still hurt me? 
Will people think I must have been crazy? Will they think I must have 
enjoyed it? Will they think I'm damaged? Will it undermine my credi-
bility? Can I answer questions about it? Can I trust my voice? Will I 
become an untouchable? Was my situation too exceptional? (No, my 
situation was not exceptional. It was terrifying, and is common.) Does 
it make my perceptions idiosyncratic? (They're not.) Does myexperi-
ence of it make my argument about it invalid? (That's the gamble.)] 
I am certain that the lesson I learned from domestic violence was 
the lesson to be learned. This same lesson is reiterated in virtually any 
woman's account of an abusive intimate relationship. Thus, the near-
universal response to the pervasive fear with which a battered woman lives is to 
redefine herself as a giving rather than a liberal self. The battered woman is 
a "giving self' and for another within an abusive marriage to precisely 
the extent to which it is too frightening and too dangerous to even 
contemplate being for oneself. As a giving self, she consents to every-
thing, absolutely, and at all levels of being, and she does so for the 
subjectivity of the other, and the survival of herself. The other must 
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live, and that is why you are. If you are going to be at all, you are going 
to be for him. And you are going to be, so you are going to be for him. 
One woman explains: 
FEAR (a) My husband was physically violent three times .... [H]e 
and I [sat] in a crowded restaurant where we were both well-known, 
me listening to him demolishing my character, that of my parents 
and friends, and when I resisted and insisted on leaving, he 
threatened to kill me. And I believed him, I sat there, I smiled, ... 
and I was terrified. 
(b) Fear of my sanity-I felt myself fragmenting-much like in descrip-
tions of schizophrenia. Bits of me seemed to be breaking off and floating 
away, and it was always more of a problem to catch them and get them back, 
like catching soap bubbles. 
CONFUSION Why had he married me? What did he want? ... 
Who had he married? It wasn't me. Who had I married? Was it 
him? 
ISOLATION-IDENTI1Y LOSS-LOSS OF CONFIDENCE-MIS-
ERY All these go together. They merge and feed one upon the 
other . . . I cried, I stormed, I took on his description of me, I wilted 
under the pressure of how to correct these so obviously irritating 
characteristics. But, was he, himself at fault. No, for I tried to be 
understanding. 
It's a long time after now-ten years . ... With an understanding offemi-
nism came a way of absolving myself of failure, of eccentricity, of non-con-
formity. Yet, I remain bruised-I keep my guard up, because . .. I'm afraid 
at times that the next punch will splinter me forever. 25 
The re-definition of self as "giving" in an abusive marriage is the 
literal death of a woman's liberal subjectivity. She learns to consent for 
the satiation of the other's desires. That becomes the meaning of" con-
sent." This does not make her an altruistic person; this makes her a 
negative. She will even remember herself as such: 
I don't find it difficult to come to certain theoretical conclusions 
based on my experiences-but I still feel as if I'm standing apart and 
outside the experience-no amount of theorizing or analyzing can de-
scribe the complexities of emotional feelings I experienced during 
my marriage. "When I analyze or theorize it's almost as if I am talking and 
thinking about another person-not myself. . . . I can't remember anything 
except six months of negative feelings . . . . I was afraid I would go mad. 26 
She tea.ches herself that this negative mode of being is inevitable: 
When I was eight, my father remarried. My new mother . . . 
shielded me from some of my father's most brutal outbursts .... 
25. D. Rhodes, S. McNeill (Eds.) Women Against Violence Against Women 232-
34 (1985) (hereinafter, WAVAW). 
26. Id. at 232. 
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[One day I asked her why she put up with my father's violence.] 
'Claudia, that's the way men are. You just have to take it. F2.7 
169 
And finally, she teaches herself that the apparently human face 
she shows the world is a fraud; you are not truly human, you are other. 
A giving self, being for another, has no entitlement to truth. You have 
relinquished the self-validating, self-creating, and self-verifying con-
nection between word and experience. You learn, in other words, to 
lie to yourself and to others. You become the lie: 
Well-educated, well-to-do people don't discuss such things. I be-
came a super cover-up artist. Shielding five children from the fact 
that their father took swipes at their mother was easy compared to 
the elaborate excuses designed for friends. [When a friend told me 
of her abuse by her husband, I was appalled, and felt pity and disgust.] 
I couldn't allow myself the solace of confiding to her that I was a 
fellow sufferer. Perhaps pride stood in my way. My reaction to her 
disclosure merely reinforced my vow never to discuss my own situa-
tion with anyone.28 
''Very few people understand this kind of fear," says Erin Pizzey, 
in Scream Quietly or the Neighbors Will Hear.29 This is not right-a lot of 
women understand this kind of fear. But with the exception of Viet-
nam veterans, no white, heterosexual man I have ever known knows 
how it feels to be afraid all of the time. Most women as well lack this 
knowledge. But many women-and there are many battered wo-
men-know what it means to define oneself in such a way as to make 
it possible to live with the truth that tomorrow you may die. If the day-
to-day decision to stay in such a marriage is "consensual," the price is 
unconscionable: for the gain of controlling fear, you give up your sub-
jective life. 
2. Promiscuous Heterosexuality: Fear and Consent 
Many more women, however, know the fear and the threat ofvio-
lence implicit in promiscuous heterosexuality. A "date" with a man 
who is utterly-aggressively-uninterested in your subjective well-be-
ing, and at the same time, utterly consumed by his expectation and his 
felt compulsion to have you is a frightening encounter. During my 
adolescence and post-adolescence I divided the world of boys and 
men into two distinct groups; those who did and those who did not 
possess "the attitude." Those with the attitude were strong, stupid, 
uninterested in me, sexually acquisitive, and potentially violent. They 
had empty stares and over-developed biceps. They openly and 
proudly displayed both their expectation of absolute entitlement to 
my sexuality and their utter lack of interest in my subjective self. The 
sense of failure and the feeling of betrayal and rage which they would 
27. Quoted from D. Martin, Battered Wives 79 (1981). 
28. [d. at 79-80. 
29. Quoted in D. Martin, Battered Wives 78 (1981). 
HeinOnline -- 15 Wis. Women’s L.J. 170 2000
170 WISCONSIN WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:149 
unquestionably feel and probably act on, were we not to have sex, was 
potent. They were very frightening although rarely "violent" and we 
always had sex. 
[Should I talk about this? Does adolescent and post-adolescent 
promiscuity make me exceptional, and therefore-again-marginal? 
(You've got to be kidding.) A better question: Is it worth it? I wonder 
if it is possible to explain-at all-to men who remember their own 
sexual adolescence and initiation as one of continual rejections from 
women, that other men-the ones who scored-got it more often than 
not by overt intimidation. That they accomplished this great triumph 
by refusing to even see the girl's subjectivity, much less give a damn 
for her welfare, by making their profound lack of concern manifest, 
and then by exploiting her resulting (fully justified) perception of his 
dangerousness. That noncriminal locker-room teenage boys are ex-
ploitative and frightening; that promiscuous heterosexuality, both ad-
olescent and post-adolescent-our ofttimes cultural prototype of 
innocent and mutual pleasure-is often fraught with fear and the 
threat of violence. Is it possible to make nondangerous men even en-
tertain the possibility that they were/are the beneficiaries of the vio-
lence threatened and acted upon by their more sexually "successful" 
teenage peers?] 
The fear of violence in promiscuous heterosexuality, when it is 
there, is always disguised and always confused. One woman explains: 
[I]t is considered quite O.K and normal for a man to try to per-
suade a woman to have sexual intercourse. He asks her to dance, 
she accepts. (She wants to, she doesn't want to but she's afraid of 
hurting his feelings, she's afraid of making him angry, she wants a man 
to dance with.) He asks her out, she accepts. (She wants to, or she 
doesn't want to, but all her friends have got blokes, she's afraid of 
making him angry, he might feel hurt, she cannot go out if she's on 
her own.) He kisses her. He puts his hand on her leg, her breast, 
her cunt. He wants to see how far he can go. She lets him. (She 
wants to, or she doesn't want to but he's taken her out after all, and 
spent money on her, she needs a lift home, she doesn't want to 
seem a prude, he might be angry.) He asks her to sleep with him. She 
accepts. (She wants to, or she doesn't want to but she thinks she 
might as well, she can't back off now, it might be O.K, she's flat-
tered that he wants her, he might be angry.) 
Or she refuses. He tries to persuade her. He tells her he loves her. 
He says she doesn't love him. He calls her a prude, immature, 
frigid. He says he needs sex. . . . Each time she finally tells him to 
stop, breaks away, he gets angry, he rages, he sulks, he tells her how 
bad it is for men to be left 'excited.' (Prick-teaser!) He teaches her 
to suck him off. He works toward his goal, which is her vagina. He 
means to have, to possess this woman. 
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This isn't rape, this is normal everyday stuff. The magazines call it 
young love. . . .30 
And another describes her own memories: 
I want to talk particularly about the violence I have experienced 
from men. .. When I was in my early teens I naively believed myself 
to be the inheritor of enlightened and liberating attitudes to sex. 
We had the pill and as far as I could see the double standard was 
diminishing, making it easier for women to be sexually active and 
assertive. Unlike my mother who was told never to say yes it was 
unpopular amongst girls I knew then to ever say no. We were con-
trolled by men's demands .... Throughout my teens I variously had 
sex with men in the backs of cars, at the fairground, under the pier 
and in lavatories a few times. Violence was implicit in many of these 
sexual encounters. I remember my arms being locked above my 
head so I could not move; I remember being bruised and bitten and 
scratched. I remember moments of rising panic when I thought the 
man was actually going to hurt me badly.3! 
171 
One way (there are others) that a young girl can respond to the 
"rising panic" she feels on a date is by defining herself as "giving." A 
straightforward, sensible, protective reaction to someone who is indif-
ferent to your subjectivity, and at the same time must have you as an 
object, is to hide your subjective self and objectify and then give your 
sexual self for his pleasure and your safety. The subjective experience 
of a date rape for a giving self is the experience of giving what must 
inevitably-definitionally-be given. The empty stares and the over-
developed biceps are not as threatening-the sex which is the culmi-
nation of the date will not feel like a rape-if the girl has defined 
herself in such a way that sexjust is "that which is given to the other." 
To withhold consent (and thus invite a rape) once she redefines her-
self as giving is not just unliberated or prudish; it is definitionally ex-
cluded. It will be followed by guilt and confusion. It will feel 
intolerably unnatural, like doing something perverted and in violation 
of one's reason for being. To be is to be sexually giving. 
The woman quoted above accounts for her consensual participa-
tion in these multiple and violent sexual encounters: 
Frequently I was either uncomfortable or in actual pain but I did not 
know how to protest or refuse. I had non-voluntary sex quite a few times 
particularly when I was drunk and the men were reckless as to 
whether or not I had willed it in the first place. Quite often I suf-
fered from thrush and cystitis, but I would never tell men to stop because 
I was in pain. During that time I often felt sick with guilt and with 
confusion but I still confused my constant sexual availability with 
liberation and freedom of .choice. A couple of times I allowed men 
30. WAVAW, supra n.26, at 27-28. 
31. [d. at 228. 
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to bugger me and one of these times I bled so much I thought I had 
hemorrhaged.32 
There is a fine line between the feeling of being threatened by an 
implied threat of force and the feeling of the sheer inevitability of sex. 
Nevertheless, they are, for the self-regarding woman, distinctively dif-
ferent experiences: the first is frightening and the second is deaden-
ing. By contrast, for a woman or girl who has defined herself as 
"giving" and her sexuality as "that which is to be given," there is no 
line. She will never experience the anxious, ambiguous fear of rape 
by a "date." But norwill she experience consensual sex as pleasurable, 
or if she does, it will be only incidentally so. She consents to sex for 
his, not for her pleasure. The sex which is the culmination of these 
dates will be consensual, but it will also be uncomfortable, unpleasant, 
painful or dangerous. It will invite venereal disease (genital sex); 
bleeding and hemorrhaging (anal sex); gagging and nausea (deep 
oral sex); bruises, lacerations and welts (sadomasochistic sex); and un-
wanted pregnancy. The giving self will not experience this pain as a 
reason to withhold consent, for she is not, by self-definition, a being 
who consents to sexual encounters for her own pleasure or withholds 
consent if she foresees pain. She unquestionably consents, but not to 
satiate her own desires. She consents to satiate the desires and feed 
the pleasure of the other. 
3. The Rape Threat: Fear and Consent 
Almost all women, including those who have never experienced 
unwanted sex or battery, have experienced the fear of rape. The 
working paper on rape from the WAVAW conference elaborates: 
The fear of rape is always with us. It affects our lives in countless 
ways-not only in that we are afraid to walk the streets late at night, 
but in all our dealings with men, however superficial these might 
be .... 
This makes us self-conscious about our bodies, the way we sit and 
stand and walk-when was the last time you saw a woman sit 
sprawled across a bus seat the way men do all the time? We keep 
our knees together, our legs crossed, our faces neutral. Somewhere 
in our minds we are always aware that any man-every man-can, if 
he wants to, use the weapon of rape against us. 
And men know it too. The man who mutters obscenities at us in the 
street knows it, the local greengrocer who insists on calling us love 
... knows it, the wolf-whistling building workers know it, the man 
reading page three on the tube and grinning at us knows it. At one 
point on Reclaim the Night in Soho, we were confronted by a large group of 
men shouting "We're on the rapist's side-we're with the rapist." They 
didn't really need to tell us. We already knew.33 
32. Id. 
33. !d. at 25. 
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One way that (some) women respond to the pervasive, silent, un-
spoken and invisible fear of rape in their lives is by giving their (sex-
ual) selves to a consensual, protective, and monogamous relationship. 
This is widely denied-but it may be widely denied because it is so 
widely presumed. It is, after all, precisely what we are supposed to do. 
One woman describes her embrace of this option thusly: 
The brutality and coldness of (promiscuous heterosexual) exper-
iences were largely instrumental in persuading me to have steady 
and secure relationships with men. I did not feel safe with lots of 
different ones. The threat of men's violence drove me into couple 
relationships. I feel ambivalent about these men. They were not 
unmitigated bastards and they did afford me protection. My 
mother would often mutter ominously about the world not being a 
safe place for women and my experiences could only confirm this. 
Being alone I felt, at times, besieged and up for grabs. Being with 
one man sheltered unwelcome attention from men in the streets, at 
parties, etc.34 
Women who give themselves to a monogamous relationship in 
order to avoid the danger of rape from others, often end up giving 
themselves within the monogamous relationship so as to avoid the 
danger of rape by their partner. These women-and it is anyone's 
guess how many there are-acutely feel the loss of identity that such a 
"giving" entails. "L" begins her story: 
I got married in 1970, I was 19 and so was he. I found marriage a 
great strain at first adjusting myself to fit in with his personality, 
character, needs and wishes. Somehow I seemed to know this is 
what I had to do. . .. £MJainly I was losing my name and 'gaining' his. I 
didn't at that time realize I had a choice.35 
Such women are in a constant state of duress, but they will only 
occasionally-and only dimly-experience it as such. A woman who 
learns to give herself in monogamy so as to obviate the fear and dan-
ger of marital rape will not experience the sex itselfas frightening: the 
sex is what she gives to avoid the danger of rape. Such a woman con-
trols danger and fear, but in exchange she gives-she alienates-her 
power to seek her own subjective pleasure through her own volition: 
the duressed gift of one's sexual self severs the connection between 
pleasure and volition. By giving yourself and your sexuality in order 
to insure your safety from danger, you lose the power to bring about 
your own pleasure. L continues: 
In the main I was enthusiastic about sex, the physical pain seemed 
to stop, or perhaps I got used to it. Even then, though, I remember 
not always wanting to do it when he did, maybe I was tired, or just 
not in the mood but I wouldn't say no because he might be hurt or 
upset. I didn't at the time feel particularly resentful about this .... 
34. Id. at 228-29. 
35. Id. at 234. 
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It was only after my first child was born ... that sex began to be a 
problem . . . . I began to resent the sexual demands my husband 
made . . . . As well as this I was working full-time so I felt generally 
harassed. But I had been advised ... not to neglect my husband. 
So I didn't. I sexually serviced him, and it began to feel just like 
that. If I said no, as I sometimes did, there would be either a row, 
well into the night, or silence which might last for days. Either way 
my tension and strain increased so I learned to be available, even if I 
didn't want to. It was quicker in the long run, so I could get some 
sleep. 
I remember feeling all kinds of hostile feelings against him when he 
invaded my body, . . . But I couldn't really articulate it, I felt 
trapped ... I was like some kind of automaton. . .. On and on it 
went with me totally drained of energy, but still I was expected to 
'have sex.' In fact I did, without enthusiasm, just as another chore, 
like doing the ironing or bathing the kids .... 
I didn't like most of the things he did to me, but I felt a little that I 
was supposed to. I faked liking what he did, including buggery 
which I found painful, but still he kept doing it.36 
Finally, and paradoxically, she gives away her own safety when she 
gives herself for safety. Protection from someone who is himself a 
source of danger is whimsical. The point at which the monogamous 
woman begins to feel that the sex in such a relationship is coercive, is 
precisely the point at which she has begun to re-define herself as self-
regarding. When the woman begins to define herself as self-regarding 
rather than giving, the sex begins to look and feel more like rape-to 
feel scary-instead of feeling boring and unpleasant and deadening. 
L describes this transformation-from "bad sex" to rape-thus: 
I could catalogue all the separate incidences of rape-that is, doing 
it against my will-but its [sic] too painful for me to recall it. In fact 
my experience is fairly commonplace. No major brutal acts, just a 
generalized abuse of my integrity .... 
It's well over a year since I left, and I think I'm beginning to re-
cover. It's hard whilst it's happening to you to realize that you are 
being exploited, fucked-over and constantly raped. Because the ef-
fect of it all is to reduce your ability to fight back, or even to see 
what its [sic] about. My confidence was constantly undermined and 
eroded .... It's all those years of rape-perhaps subtle rather than 
brutal, but rape nevertheless. I was lucky I got out after ten years of 
marriage. Its [sic] only now that I can see what effect it had on me. 
It was rape and I couldn't name it. Had I known I'm sure I would have got 
out sooner. Rape in marriage is an issue, naming it is the first step in a 
campaign which could stop the misery of millions of women s lives.37 
36. !d. at 235-36. 
37. !d. at 236. 
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4. Street Hassling: Fear and Consent 
Finally, for exceptionally privileged and protected young women 
and girls who do not learn elsewhere the threat under which they live, 
street hassling gets the message across. It is a potent daily reminder of 
the quality of the state-of-nature outside the protective institutions in 
which they will be expected to encase their lives. Street hassling is not 
trivial. Sexual assaults and batteries on the street are threatening 
("Come sit on my face, bitch. Hey bitch, I said come sit on my face! 
HEY BITCH, I MEAN YOU ..... "), constant (most white men have 
experienced only a few street assaults by strangers. Many women-
perhaps most women who live in urban areas-have experienced hun-
dreds), criminal (they are assaults, and when accompanied by touch-
ings, they are batteries), frightening (look down, cut across the street, 
shrink into your coat, let your mind go blank, don't look up), unac-
knowledged (look down, hope it stops, hope no one else hears, hope 
no one else sees), disorienting and self-alienating (smile so he might 
stop ... learn to smile-to show pleasure-when you are frightened), 
uncompensated (of course), and unpunished (ditto). Street hassling 
is also the earliest-and therefore the defining-lesson in the source 
of a girl's disempowerment. If they haven't learned it anywhere else, 
street hassling teaches girls that their sexuality implies their vulnera-
bility. It is damaging to be pointed at, jeered at, and laughed at for 
one's sexuality, and it is infantilizing to know you have to take it. The 
woman on the street is under the thumb of the abusive man in exactly 
the way that children are under the thumb of abusive parents. She is 
an object of his pleasure, his contempt and his disposal. The subjec-
tive experience reflects the treatment. It feels frightening and infan-
tilizing. It always made me feel-still makes me feel-like a helpless 
and guilty child. I know that I am in the hands of a superior power 
which will not be even seen, much less checked, by those from whom I 
might expect protection-the state, sympathetic men. When I refuse 
to let danger inhibit my movement (which is often), I pay a high 
price. On "public" streets, and on "public" transportation, I can ex-
pect to be touched, jeered at, yelled at, sexually ridiculed and ex-
posed. This does not make me feel (primarily) "angry," "wronged" or 
even "assaulted." It makes me feel sexually ridiculous, exposed, dirty, 
vulgar, vulnerable and afraid. 
One way that (some) women and girls respond to the jolt of 
fear-the "rising panic"-that street hassling engenders is by defining 
themselves as "giving;" by hiding-suppressing-their subjective selves 
and then giving away for visual consumption their sexual appearance. 
She gives up her sexual appearance for visual consumption, in ex-
change for the safety of her subjectivity. Thought stops. Feeling stops. 
She must-and does-stop thinking and feeling when she is on the 
street, because it is the thinking, feeling, subjective person who is most 
denied and hence most threatened by harassment. The subjective, 
thinking, feeling being must hide. What she becomes on the street is 
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visually consumed, given-away sex. To become less fearful (and 
thereby relatively freer in movement) she separates her sexual appear-
ance from her subjective self, hides the latter and gives the former 
away. She gives it away for his pleasure and for her safety. 
This quasi-consensual bargain feels horrible. Your body, objecti-
fied and separated from your subjective being, becomes dead weight. 
You hide the subjective identity you value, and you de-value what you 
can't hide and must give-your objective sexuality. As you do so, you 
learn self-deception and self-belittlement-you learn to smile when 
you are in pain. And finally, you learn to hate that which forces this 
violent rupture of subjective self and objective sexuality, and it is your 
sexuality which forces it. 
[Should I talk about this? Domestic violence is too exceptional; 
street hassling is-too ordinary? Too frequent? Too trivial? Am I 
over sensitive? (No. It is because of their frequency, their constancy, 
and their banality that the sexual threats expressed on the street are 
so effective, and so foundational. They shrink us, rather than enrage 
us.) Again a harder question: Is this worth it? Most men I've dis-
cussed this with have said something like the following: "Yes, I agree 
it's horrible. But men go through it too. I was bullied on the schooly-
ard as a kid and felt just that way." To point out the obvious: the 
defining condition of your childhood-vulnerability because of size 
and strength disparities-is the defining condition of my adulthood. 
You grew out of vulnerability as you became a man, I grew into vulnera-
bility as I became a woman. For women, the acquisition of adult sexu-
ality ushers in, not out, those paralyzing fears that you identify with 
childhood. If you really understand this, because you remember get-
ting bullied on the schoolyard, then it should not be such a mystery to 
you why so many of the women you know act like children.] 
We all-men and women-live under a terrifying threat of mate-
rial deprivation. We spend a great deal of energy warding off that 
danger and suppressing that fear. We pay our employer to protect us 
from that threat with our surplus labor value, and we spend considera-
ble time and energy legitimating the employer's authority and "right" 
to do so. Similarly, we all live with the threat of criminal violence, pay 
the state to protect us from the threat, and expend energy legitimat-
ing its authoritative right to do so as welL Both employer and state 
become authorities whose legitimacy we regularly affirm. With every 
such act of affirmation, of legitimization, we become less like the self-
regarding character presupposed by liberalism. And, by virtue in part 
of our continuing affirmation of these authorities, the authorities be-
come increasingly dangerous themselves. 
Women, though, and only women, live with a third danger: wo-
men and only women must somehow ward off the threat of acquisitive 
and violent male sexuality. It should not be so hard to understand 
(why is it so hard to understand?) that women develop protective strat-
egies for coping with this additional threat. The means with which we 
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do so-primarily by learning to give ourselves to consensual, protec-
tive relationships, within which we then define ourselves as "giving"-
are not the product of false consciousness or brain-washing. But nor 
are they value-creating voluntary and mutual relationships worthy of 
celebration. They are no less and no more than the product of our 
victimization: they are coherent, understandable responses to very 
real danger. Until we create a better world, they are also all we have. 
B. The Giving Self and Liberal Feminism 
A liberal feminist theory of law which presumptively values con-
sensual transactions on the assumption that the giving of consent is 
motivationally self-regarding, without addressing the fear that molds 
women's self-definition, runs the risk of missing altogether the real 
causes of women's misery. I will explore only one example. 
Sexual harassment of women students by male professors is now 
recognized as a discriminatory injury and an actionable harm. And, 
although it constitutes a triumph of radical-not liberal-feminism,38 
the prohibition of coercive, academic sexual harassment is neverthe-
less fully consistent with liberal and liberal feminist premises. The 
sex-for-a-grade that follows sexual harassment by a teacher of a stu-
dent is characterized by liberals and liberal feminists as "coercive" be-
cause it is for a grade. Thus, whatever other reason might exist for 
prohibiting sex-for-grade transactions (and there are others), prohibi-
tion of these sexual transfers is fully consistent with liberal premises: 
the sex is a compensable assault because it is non-consensual. 
This liberal feminist reconstruction of what was originally a more 
radical insight, I believe, rather significantly misses the mark. The 
greater damage done on college campuses, to women, by men, and 
through sex, is precisely what the liberal conception of academic sex-
ual harassment definitionally excludes. Women who are faced with 
the choice of sleeping with the teacher to get the A they academically 
earned, or settling instead for a C, have undoubtedly been injured. 
But with all due respect for the harm done to those students, there is a 
deeper tragedy, a more profound loss, and a greater harm done daily 
in campus bedrooms, and these relatively astute women who "know 
what they should have gotten" are decidedly not the victims. The 
38. For a general sense of the difference between liberal and radical conceptions 
of the harm in sexual harassment, contrast the radical treatment of the topic in C. 
Mackinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination 
(1979) with the liberal treatment in B. Dziech and L. Weiner, The Lecherous Profes-
sor (1984). Both books reflect their authors' passionate conviction that harassment, 
either in school or at work, is terribly wrong. But there is a vivid difference in the 
characterization of that wrong. Dziech and Weiner conceive of their mission, I think, 
as an attempt to uncover a festering but exceptional wound: a few bad apples-the 
"lecherous professors"-sexually molest a not-so-few number of female students. 
MacKinnon, by contrast, reveals sexual harassment in the workplace to be continuous 
with sexuality outside of the workplace. Sex in the workplace, because it is at work, 
poses a different injury than that outside of work. 
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greater misery, I believe, is a product of the fully consensual and 
highly regarded romantic attachments of female graduate students 
and assistant professors, or undergraduates and research assistants. It 
is a mistake to infer, as the liberal feminist is inclined to do, from the 
wrongness of coercive, for-grade campus sex that consensual sex be-
tween male teachers and female students is therefore good. We cannot 
and should not so infer. 
Smart male students view themselves as all sorts of things, includ-
ing young intellectuals. A good male student will often attach himself 
to a brilliant professor, and will aspire to be like him. A smart female 
student who defines herself as "giving" might attach herself in this way 
to a brilliant professor and aspire to be like him. But it's not very 
likely. Unlike the male student, she is far more likely to be attracted 
to the brilliant professor, and aspire not to be like him, but to give 
herself to him. In her own way the "giving" female student will seek 
the recognition and praise which all students crave, by offering her 
sexuality. She may be intellectually gifted and she may perceive her-
self as such. But to the extent that the female student who is a "giving 
self' tries to define herself as an intellectual, she does so at the cost of 
internal war. For the definition of "self' as a sexually giving self rather 
than an academically demanding self is always there, always in compe-
tition, always available. For the female student, the intellectual self 
must fight the giving self, both in external and internal reality. The 
women who lose this battle have lost far more than the women who 
lost the A to which they were entitled, and so has the world. 
All good students, male and female, love their professor's displays 
of intellectual brilliance; this is part of the joy of being a student. For 
the giving woman, however, that love is dangerous and ambiguous. 
Like male students, she craves recognition by her teachers. Her intel-
lectual self craves recognition for intellectual work done. Her "giving 
self' though, craves the recognition that can only come through the 
teacher's acceptance of her gift of self. Consequently, male professors 
have a power which I suspect they often do not know they have, and 
when they do, they don't understand it. The male professor, as au-
thority, is in a position to validate one or the other of the woman's 
conflicting self-definitions. If he reinforces the intellectual self, the 
woman's self-definition as intellectual is encouraged. If he reinforces 
the giving self, by accepting the woman's offered sexuality, the wo-
man's internal war is over. The woman receives an authoritative pro-
nouncement to the effect that her contribution to art, history, music 
or whatever will be in a form that she has always suspected and even 
hoped for-that it will be, at root, sexual. Her contribution will not 
be in the delivery of ideas-which after all will most likely not be the 
work of genius-but will be instead through her giving of herself to 
one whose intellectual contribution, unlike her own, may be. She is a 
jewel whose intellectual talents will be used to make all the more per-
fect her rare gift. The female student who loves intellect, and who is 
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aware of herself as a sexual being, will not only consent to these ro-
mantic entanglements. She will crave them-fiercely, continuously, 
and with heart, mind and soul. 
The pleasure to be had in such a relationship bears a disconcert-
ing similarity to that of a cocaine high. Furthermore, both are damag-
ing and addictive, although only cocaine is recognized as such. The 
woman feels pleasure in making a contribution to the culture she re-
spects-even deeply respects-through a fusion of intellectuality and 
sexuality. It can feel like a mystical blend: a transcendental, trans-
formative experience. Self-objectification can feel beautiful. It feels 
palpably meaningful to enrich the life of someone who is admirable 
and immersed in a discipline you value by merely being, and by giving 
what you are. The gift of self can feel more significant, universal, tran-
scendental, and religious than the paltry competition for status in the 
seminar rooms in which one's (ex)-peers are engaged. 
The pain of these relationships-as well as the damage they do-
far exceeds their Cassandra-like high. The woman's self-respect will 
hit a new low with which she is probably unfamiliar and for which she 
is totally unprepared, for at least three reasons. First, for a life of such 
servitude to feel of value, the man being served must be perceived as 
truly superior. The more skeptical the woman becomes of the man's 
genius, the more she must downgrade her own potential in order to 
maintain what is really central to these relationships-the distance be-
tween them. Whatever intellectual insecurities she brought with her 
are multiplied. This is a very bad way to feel about oneself. Second, 
the life of servitude to genius is likely to be a lazy, privileged, and 
pampered life. The woman will lose whatever employable skills she 
once had. She becomes unable to support herself. A given, empty 
self will not have the self-possession it takes to work. This sort of self-
imposed, consensual unemployability is debilitating and infantilizing. 
This is also a bad way to feel about oneself. And finally, the woman 
who is using the relationship as a means of entrance into a discipline 
is being manipulative, and knows it. This too is not a good way to feel 
about oneself. The cumulative effect is a smothering blanket of self-
contempt. You lose your respect for your intelligence, your compe-
tency in the world, and your moral character, and all for good reason: 
you have lost yourself. 
This is not a subtle point, nor an invisible loss. "Falling-in-love" 
with high school teachers, college professors, or research assistants re-
ally does destroy the productivity, the careers, the earning potential, 
and eventually the self respect of many gifted women. Smart women 
drop out of high school, college and graduate school (and pretty wo-
men are at highest risk) to date, to marry, to help, and to serve those 
they perceive as intellectual giants. Eventually they learn boredom, 
the weariness of inactivity, and the self-contempt of nonproductivity. 
But in spite of its incredible familiarity, most academic men and many 
academic women do not see this as a harm at all, and if they do see it 
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as a harm, they do not see it as worth discussing. This ignorance must 
be ideological. My guess is that we cannot see the harm of these con-
sensual relationships to precisely the degree to which we have adopted 
the blinders of liberalism. It is a harm caused not by coercive, occa-
sional acts, but by the way we have defined the self that consents to the 
non-coercive relationships in which we engage. It is a harm that a 
liberal legal regime which resolutely regards the giving of consent as 
the infallible proxy of an increase in self-regarded and self-assessed 
value cannot possibly address. 
As I have argued elsewhere, there is no reason that liberalism or 
liberal legalism need be thus constrained. Liberalism need not com-
mit itself to the narrow normative category of consent, and when liber-
alism has been at its strongest-when it has been a generous and 
spirited force for progress-it has not been. There is even greater 
reason why a liberal feminist theory of law should not be so con-
strained. A "liberal feminism" would be truer to not only the guiding 
historical strengths of liberalism but also to the goals of feminism if it 
would aim to eradicate the fear that presently dominates women's 
choices, rather than merely celebrating in the name of formal equality 
whatever choices we presently make. The stunted self-definitions 
which women embrace today are at least in part a reaction to fear: the 
fear we have learned first hand from the violence in our lives, and the 
fear we have been taught to harbor. Both feminism and liberalism 
have been at their best when they have attacked the multiple dangers 
that rule people's lives. Ifwe could get rid of the danger, we could get 
rid of the fear; without the fear, our choices would, I have no doubt, 
take on great meaning. When we are free of fear, we will indeed be 
strengthened rather than weakened by the "voluntary transactions" 
which we enter. When we are free of fear we will be truly autono-
mous. Then our "giving selves"-if we choose to be such-will be 
something to admire rather than disparage. For only then will our 
generosity, our charity, and our communitarian instincts be true to 
ourselves as well as nurturant of the needs of others. 
II. RADICAL FEMINISM AND THE ETHICAL PRIMACY OF POWER 
AND EQUALITY 
Radical feminist legal theory begins with a description of women 
which is diametrically opposed to that embraced by liberal feminists. 
Liberal feminists assume a definitional equality--a "sameness"-be-
tween the female and male experience of consensual choice, and then 
argue that the legal system should respect that fundamental, empirical 
equality. In sharp contrast, radical feminists assume a definitional ine-
quality of women-women are deftnitionally the disempowered 
group-and urge the legal system to eradicate that disempowerment 
and thereby make women what they presently are not, and that is 
equal. Radical feminism thus begins with a denial of the liberal femi-
nist's starting assumption. Women and men are not equally autono-
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mous individuals. Women, unlike men, live in a world with two 
sovereigns-the state, and men-and this is true not just some of the 
time but all of the time.39 Women, unlike men, are definitionally sub-
missive twice over; once vis-a-vis the state, and once vis-a-vis the supe-
rior power of men. A legal regime which ignores this central reality 
will simply perpetuate the fundamental, underlying inequality. 
The cause of women's dis empowerment, as well as its effect, is the 
expropriation of our sexuality. Women are the group, in Catharine 
MacKinnon's phrase, "from whom sexuality is expropriated,"40 in the 
same sense that workers are, definitionally, the group from whom la-
bor is expropriated. Women are the-gender from whom sex is taken. 
Women as women suffer the threat of acquisitive and potentially vio-
lent male sexuality. The threat of male violence and violent sexuality 
both defines the class woman and causes her disempowerment and the 
expropriation of her sexuality, just as the threat of starvation and ma-
terial deprivation both defines the worker, and causes his disempower-
ment and the expropriation of his labor. 
This much, radical feminist legal theory shares with radical femi-
nism, and vvith this much I am in full agreement. Where radical femi-
nist legal theory has departed from radical feminism, I believe, is in 
the normative argument it draws from the insight that women are, 
definitionally, the group from whom sexuality is expropriated. The 
argument, I believe, owes more to radical legalism than to radical fem-
inism. The argument has three steps. 
First, radical feminist legal theory, like radical legalism, begins 
with a highly particularized although largely implicit description of 
the human being. People are, in short, assumed to be such that there 
exists a correlation between objectively equal distributions of power-
39. To my knowledge, Catharine MacKinnon has given the only detailed exposi-
tion of radical feminist theory. See MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the 
State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 Signs 515 (1982) reprinted in N. Keohane, M. Rosaldo, 
and B. Gelpi, Feminist Theory, A Critique OfIdeology 1 (1982) (hereinafter, MacKin-
non, Agenda, with page references to the Keohane text) and Feminism, Marxism, 
Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 Signs 635 (1983). Her two arti-
cles in Signs are deservedly regarded as classics. There is, however, very little else, 
although Ruth Colker's submission to this journal is a notable exception. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, there are remarkably few radical feminist legalists teaching in Ameri-
can law schools, which is not to say that there aren't a great many radical feminist 
lawyers. 
40. The exact quote: 
As the organized expropriation of the work of some for the benefit of others 
defines a class-workers-the organized expropriation of the sexuality of 
some for the use of others defines the sex, woman. Heterosexuality is its 
structure, gender and family its congealed forms, sex roles its qualities gen-
eralized to social persona, reproduction a consequence, and control its 
issue. 
MacKinnon, Agenda, supra n.39 at 2. See also id. at 14-15. 
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including sexual power-and subjectively happy and good lives.41 
Domination makes us evil and submission makes us miserable; sub-
stantive equality will make us both moral and happy; and both claims 
are true because of, and by reference to, this conception of our essen-
tial human nature.42 Radical legal theorists, including radical feminist 
legal theorists, are as committed to the equation of objective, substan-
tive equality and subjective well being, and the view of our nature on 
which it rests, as the liberal legal theorist is committed to the equation 
of objective consent and subjective happiness. 
Second, both radical legalism and radical feminist legalism draw 
from this depiction of the human being the normative inference that 
it is the imbalance of power which facilitates expropriation (of work 
for the radical legalist, of sex for the radical feminist legalist), rather 
than the expropriation itself, which is defitnitionally bad, and then the 
further inference that it is definitionally bad whether or not the expropria-
tion it facilitates is experientially felt as painfuL 43 The strategic conse-
quence immediately follows: radical legal reform should aim to 
eradicate hierarchy and thereby attain a substantively equal social 
world. Thus we should oppose not what makes us miserable-the vio-
lent expropriation of our work or our sexuality-but the hierarchy of 
power which facilitates it, for by doing so we will better target the true 
cause of our misery.44 We should support not what makes us happy, 
but what makes us substantively equal, because by doing so we will 
invariably further our true interest, even if not our felt pleasure. 
Thus, radical feminist legal theory shares with general radical legal 
thought a refusal to ground its opposition to expropriation (whether 
of sex or work) in the subjective suffering of the disempowered which 
such expropriation entails. Instead, for both groups expropriation 
must be opposed because it is symptomatic of the true cause of our 
misery-our material or sexual disempowerment, respectively-re-
flecting in turn our relative material or sexual inequality. The expro-
priation which the disempowered suffer is regarded by the radical as 
bad, but not because the expropriation has been shown to be painful, 
but instead because it is symptomatic of a larger violation of our essen-
tial nature, and hence of our inherent ideal. 
Finally, radical feminist legal theorists share with radical legalists 
a methodological insistence that the correlation between objective 
41. The assumption that powerlessness and subordination are against our true 
interest is so pervasive in radical discourse that it is rarely explicated. It does not, of 
course, imply that the powerless can never feel happy. It does, though, imply that our 
nature is such that in an ideally equal world, we would be happier, more fulfilled, or 
more fully human. 
42. See MacKinnon, Agenda, supra n.39. This comes through strongly, although 
still implicitly rather than explicitly, in MacKinnon's exchange with Carol Gilligan, 
published in Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 Buffalo L. 
Rev. 11, 72-77 (1985) (hereinafter, Buffalo Symposium). 
43. MacKinnon, Agenda, supra n.39, at 19-20. 
44. Id. at 19. Also see id. at 25-26, n.59. 
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equality and subjective well-being is foundational and definitional; it is 
therefore not something that can be discredited by counter-example. 
Both groups of theorists accordingly refuse to credit the phenomenologi-
cal evidence that the essentially descriptive claims that underlie the 
normative commitment to substantive equality may be false.45 Thus, 
to radical legalists generally, and to radical feminist legalists in partic-
ular, the extent to which the disempowered desire anything other 
than their own empowerment, and anything at odds with an equalita-
rian idea, is the extent to which the disempowered are victims of false 
consciousness. Phenomenological reports by the disempowered of 
pleasure and desire that counter the radical correlation of equality 
and subjective well-being thus reinforce, rather than cast in doubt, the 
radical's definitional assumptions. They reflect the permeating influ-
ence of our objective condition, not the limit, imposed by subjective 
pleasure and desire, of the normative ideal. 
The striking political contribution of radical feminist legal theory 
has been to extend the umbrella of the normative argument of radical 
legalism to include women as well as men, and thus to address hierar-
chies of gender as well as hierarchies dictated by class and race. If 
hierarchy is bad, then hierarchies and sexual hierarchies according to 
sex and gender are bad; if disempowerment is a prescription for mis-
ery, then women's disempowerment is a prescription for misery; and if 
expropriation is bad, then expropriation of our sexuality is bad.46 
The radical feminist legalist's commitment to gender equality stems 
from her empirical insistence that in the only respect which should be 
of concern to radical legalists, women and men are the same: women, 
45. The problem is succinctly stated in the following passage: 
In order to account for women's consciousness ... feminism must grasp that 
male power produces the world before it distorts it. Women's acceptance of 
their condition does not contradict its fundamental unacceptability if wo-
men have little choice but to become persons who freely choose women's 
roles. For this reason, the reality of women's oppression is, finally, neither 
demonstrable nor refutable empirically. Until this is confronted on the level 
of method, criticism of what exists can be undercut by pointing to the reality 
to be criticized. Women's bondage, degradation, damage, complicity, and 
inferiority-together with the possibility of resistance, movement, or excep-
tions-will operate as barriers to consciousness rather than as means of ac-
cess to what women need to become conscious of in order to change. 
MacKinnon, Agenda at 28. 
Consciousness·raising is itself defined restrictively, so as to minimize conflict between 
commitment to method and the substantive goal of equality: 
In consciousness raising, often in groups, the impact of male dominance is 
concretely uncovered and analyzed through the collective speaking of wo-
men's experience, from the perspective of that experience. 
MacKinnon, Agenda at 5-6. 
Further attempts to deal with the same problem appear at 20 n.42, 19-20, and at 6, 
n.7. 
46. Thus, the persistent parallelism between work and sex, class and gender, 
Marxism and Feminism. Id. at 2. 
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like men, suffer from relative disempowerment and inequality, and will 
therefore benefit from empowerment and equality. Women, like 
men,just are such that objective inequality will cause us subjective mis-
ery, and objective empowerment-and thus, equality-will be our 
script for salvation. The legal strategy is directly entailed. Women are 
made miserable by inequality and enlivened by equality. What we 
should do with law, then, if we mean to address the problem of wo-
men's suffering, is disable the objective hierarchies of gender that 
cause it. The scope and depth of women's power must be increased, 
and the sphere of disempowerment must be shrunk. Legal reform 
should therefore be directed toward a dismantling of gendered 
hierarchies. 
The inclusion of women under the radical legalist's normative 
umbrella is a great triumph, but it is costly: the adoption of radical 
legalist methodology by feminist legal theorists has also occasioned a 
damaging methodological divide between radical feminism and radi-
cal feminist legalism. Radical feminist legal theorists, true to their 
radicalism, refuse to consider whether or not the definitional implica-
tion it assumes between objective equality and subjective well-being 
resonates with women's desires and pleasures, and hence whether the 
conception of the human on which that implication is based is true of 
women. The radical feminist legal theorist-to the extent that she is a 
radical-will-must-deny that substantive equality in any sphere 
could ever be less than ideal or that empowerment of women could 
ever work to our disadvantage. Thus, to radical feminists, that women 
on occasion take pleasure in their own submissiveness, is simply a 
manifestation of their disempowered state, not a meaningful counter-
example to the posited egalitarian ideal. As with radical legalists gen-
erally, the stated definitional ideal must trump the experiential 
counter-report. 
For feminists, this radical legalist methodology should raise seri-
ous warning signals. First, we should remember that the ideal and the 
description of "essential human nature" on which it rests is itself 
drawn from a male, if "left" intellectual tradition, and is therefore not 
an ideal we should readily assume will be true of women.47 The ideal, 
in other words, against which we are judging our own and each 
others' consciousness to be "false" may be an ideal which is true of 
men, but not women. But second, and perhaps more fundamentally, 
it is feminism's most crucial insight that our experience must be pri-
mary-and not to be trumped by posited ideals or definitions.48 As 
47. I do not mean to imply that either the concept or the experience of "women" 
is or should be any more fixed than the concept or experience of equality. When and 
if the concept of "human" comes to include women's experience, the point made in 
the text could be modified accordingly: the ideal posited by radical legalism is not 
true to human, rather than just woman s reality. 
48. The methodological difference traced in the text between radical feminism 
and radical legal feminism is reflected in this substantive difference: radical legal femi-
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feminists, we should be wary of our attraction to a masculinist ideal, 
and we should be even more concerned when that ideal is then em-
ployed to run roughshod over experimental insights, painstakingly 
unearthed from our consciousness. 
A. A Hedonistic Phenomenological Critique of Radical Feminist Legal 
Theory 
Radical feminist legal theorists' failure to credit phenomenologi-
cal reports of conflict between egalitarian ideals and women's subjec-
tive, hedonic, felt pleasures is generally benign, for one simple reason. 
The area of conflict is not great. Women want the fruits of substantive 
equality, and increasingly want them regardless of whether the means 
for getting them implicate equal treatment of the respects in which we 
are like men, or "different treatment" of the respects in which we are 
different. Thus, women both want and would be better off with equal 
pay for work of comparable worth, equal protection of laws, equal 
voice in governance, equal access to political, educational and busi-
ness employment opportunities. Women both want and would be bet-
ter off with special treatment of the different ways in which pregnancy 
disables us from employment, affirmative action to correct the de-
cades of exclusion from all-male employment opportunities, and non-
parallel, have-it-both ways legislation which at one and the same time 
mandates the integration of all-male enclaves and the protection of 
all-female clubs and schools, if that's what it takes. Women want the 
goods which substantive equality will deliver. Over vast areas of our 
lives, there is no conflict between our desires, our felt pleasures, and 
radical feminist ideals. 
In one area of our lives, however, -namely our erotic lives-
there has emerged a conflict between the radical feminist legal theo-
rists' conception of an equalitarian ideal and women's subjective de-
sire. The radical feminist's commitment to equality, and 
identification of the expropriation of our sexuality as the conse-
quence of our relative disempowerment entails the normative conclu-
sion that sexual inequality itselfis what is politically undesirable. Thus, 
male dominance and female submission in sexuality is the evil: they 
express as well as are women's substantive inequality. But women re-
port-with increasing frequency and as often as not in consciousness-
raising sessions-that equality in sexuality is not what we find pleasura-
ble or desirable.49 Rather, the experience of dominance and submis-
sion that go with the controlled, but fantastic, "expropriation" of our 
nists place women's condition in her lack of power, while radical feminists describe 
her condition in terms of greater concreteness and specificity, such as her reproduc-
tive and mothering role. For a discussion of radical feminist conceptions of human 
nature, see A. Jagger, Feminist Politics And Human Nature 83-123 (1983). 
49. For some descriptions from heterosexual women, see A. Snitow, C. Stansell, 
and S. Thompson (eds.) Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality (1983) and for 
some descriptions from lesbian women, see P. Califia, Sapphistry: The Book of Lesbian 
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sexuality is precisely what is sexually desirable, exciting and pleasura-
ble-in fantasy for many; in reality for some. This creates a conflict 
between theory and method as well as between stated ideal and felt 
pleasure: what should we do when the consciousness that is raised in 
consciousness-raising finds pleasure in what is definitionally regarded 
as substantively undesirable-sexual submission, domination and 
erotic inequality? In the words of one prominent feminist: "how can 
you maintain that you desire freedom and equality, when fundamen-
tally [what you desire is to be] a slave?"50 The conflict between felt 
pleasure and stated ideal has become a dilemma for radical feminism, 
but it has created an unprecedented debacle for our very young radi-
cal feminist legal theory, and one which threatens to be fatal. 
The dilemma for feminism, I believe, is a real one; but the crisis 
atmosphere to which this dilemma has led in radical feminist legal 
thought, I will argue, is unnecessary. Radical feminist legal theorists-
distinctively, in feminist literature-respond to the conflict between 
political ideal and subjective, erotic pleasure by adamantly refusing to 
address it, and it is that refusal more than the dilemma itself which is 
threatening the survival of radical feminist legal theory. In the femi-
nist legal literature two strategies of avoidance have emerged. The 
first-advocated by Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon-re-
gards the undeniable reality of the pleasure many women find in the 
eroticization of controlled submission as simply an example-perhaps 
an example par excellence-of the false consciousness of the op-
pressed.51 The desires reflected in fantasies of erotic domination are 
false definitionally-they are false because the object of desire is sub-
mission, and submission is precisely what is definitionally undesirable. 
The second strategy-advocated by Sylvia Law and Nan Hunter-con-
stitutes in essence a retreat to liberal principles. Fantasies are private 
and beyond political analysis; the role of law should be to expand, not 
shrink, the options available to women, including the option, if freely 
chosen, of masochistic desire, fantasy, practice and pleasure. 52 
I will examine in another section the pornography debate which 
these two feminist responses have generated. Here, I want to focus on 
what the two factions share: both positions, at critical theoretical junctures, 
abandon feminist practice. As a result both positions definition ally ex-
clude the very issue which should be of greatest concern to feminists, 
Sexuality (1980) and Rubin, Sexual Politics, the New Right and the Sexual Fringe, in What 
Color Is Your Handkerchief: A Lesbian S/M Sexuality Reader 28 (1979). 
50. M. Marcus, A Taste For Pain: On Masochism and Female Sexuality 210 
(1981) (hereinafter, Marcus, A Taste for Pain). 
51. See Agenda, supra note 40. Also, see E. Morgan, The Eroticization Of Male 
Dominance/Female Submission (1975) and Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Les-
bian Existence, 5 Signs 631 (1980). 
52. See the Amicus Brief filed by Nan Hunter and Sylvia Law on behalf of the 
Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, in American Booksellers Association v. William Hudnut, No 84-3147 
(1985). 
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and that is the meaning and the value, to women, of the pleasure we 
take in our fantasies of eroticized submission. The MacKinnon posi-
tion that the pleasure in erotic submission is "false" because sexual 
submission is that which is undesirable resolves by definitional fiat 
what should be resolved by experiential, particularized, contextual-
ized investigation-and that is what these fantasies of eroticized sub-
mission mean, what their value is in our lives, and what they can tell us 
about the desirability as well as the nature of sexual equality and 
power. The Law/Hunter position that fantasies are free choices 
which-again definitionally-must like all other choices be respected, 
hides the same issues, but this time in the name of liberal tolerance 
rather than radical equalitarianism. 
This abandonment by feminist legal theorists of the phenomeno-
logical realm of pleasure and desire is a function of legalism, not true 
feminism. It reflects the extent to which we have embraced the ideals 
of legalism-whether we regard those ideals as substantive equality, 
liberal tolerance, privacy or individual autonomy-rather than the 
methodology of feminism-careful attention to phenomenological 
narrative. It reflects the extent to which we have allowed liberal and 
radical norms drawn from non-feminist traditions to become the crite-
ria by which we judge the narratives of our lives that emerge from 
consciousness-raising, instead of the other way around. More than any 
other issue, the pleasure that we obtain from the eroticization of sub-
mission poses an indissoluble conflict-or exposes an indissoluble 
conflict-between feminist method and feminist-legalist ideals, 
whether that legalism is radical or liberal. Hiding this conflict under 
the rug-whether in the name of liberal tolerance or radical equal-
ity-does far more harm than the conflict itself could ever dream of 
inflicting. 
1. Equalitarian Ideals and Erotic Submission 
Consider these two quotes, juxtaposed by the Danish radical femi-
nist Maria Marcus in the introduction to her book on female masoch-
ism, A Taste For Pain:53 
"We regard our personal experience, and our feelings about that 
experience, as the basis for an analysis of our common situation 
. . . . The first requirement for raising class consciousness is hon-
esty, in private and in public, with ourselves and other women." 
SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL (Redstockings Manifesto) 
"And Sister, if you can't turn on to a man who won't club you and 
drag you off by the hair, that's yours (hang-up). Keep your hang-
ups the hell out of this revolution." 
SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL (Lilith's Manifesto)54 
53. Marcus, supra n.50. 
54. [d., dedication page. 
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The definitional exclusion of phenomenology now evident in radical 
feminist legal theory is not, as the above quotes should demonstrate, 
solely a function of legalist loyalties. It reflects a broader dilemma in 
radical feminism. Feminists outside of law, however, are at least talk-
ing about the problem, and it is to that conversation I want to briefly 
tum. 
The contours of the conflict between stated ideal and felt plea-
sure, and between method and theory with which radical feminism is 
now grappling, I believe, are starkly brought out in Marcus's detailed, 
moving, and candid account of her own profoundly ambivalent reac-
tion to The Story of 0.55 The Story of 0 is, in Marcus's phrase, a "maso-
chistic pipedream."56 Written pseudonymously in the mid-fifties, it is 
without question the unsurpassed, modem, masochistic text. It is a 
stunning piece of pornography. Marcus summarizes the plot thusly: 
Chateau Roissy is owned by a secret brotherhood, and there Rene 
abandons his lover to the inhabitants and their regime. Briefly, this 
aims to tum the women who come there into utter slaves, with the 
aid of force, whips and rape. These means are used according to 
carefully arranged and familiar rituals-performed sometimes by 
the gentlemen, sometimes by the servants-and in the course of a 
few weeks 0 has become what they wish her to be. She has learnt to 
obey the rules of the mansion, which are all concerned with her 
three orifices-never to close her mouth; always to be dressed so 
that she is freely accessible, including from behind. The three ori-
fices are the only things of hers that are of importance, so they no 
longer belong to her, but only to the men. She may not use her 
mouth to speak with (except when asked to do so) and neither is 
she allowed to look on a man's face-she may not raise her eyes 
above the level of his genitals, her lord and master .... 
Sir Stephen (her Master) treats her with a mixture of chivalry, con-
tempt and cruelty. He mainly makes use of the orifice most subject 
to shame . . . , he whips her or has her whipped, he lends her to 
others and talks about her in most brutal terms to the others .... 
The Story of 0 is the best pornographic book I know for a sadomas-
ochistic public. Just listen to how 0 is shown the whip: 
Her hands were still pinioned behind her back. She was shown 
the riding-crop, black, long and slender, made of fine bamboo 
sheathed in leather, an article such as one finds in the display-
windows of expensive saddle-makers' shops; the leather whip-
the one she's seen tucked in the first man's belt-was long, 
with six lashes each ending in a knot; there was a third whip 
whose numerous light cords were several times knotted and 
stiff, quite as if soaked in water, and they actually had been 
soaked in water, as 0 was able to verify when they stroked her 
belly with those cords ... 57 
55. P. Reage, The Story Of 0 (1954). 
56. Marcus, supra n.50, at 197. 
57. Id. at 193-95. 
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Marcus quickly alludes to the very general conflict between plea-
sure and democratic political ideal which she perceives to be at least 
in part the novel's subject-matter: 
O's compulsive submissiveness goes against all the ideas we live by 
in Western democracies, in which every human being is born free 
and equal and this freedom and equality must not be suppressed. 
The Story of 0 says the opposite, that some people, possibly all peo-
ple, are born into inequality and bondage, and can only be happy 
by losing their false freedom and equality and giving themselves 
over to submissiveness and slavery.58 
But Marcus is clear, The Story of 0 is not a story about democracy; it is a 
"fable about women."59 She is equally clear that O's masochistic 
pleasures and desires, like the rest of ours, are socially constructed: 
The Story of 0 is simply the story of a woman as male society sees 
her .... 
o has everything. She is the unaggressive, passive, penis-less little 
creature adapting to the role offered to her. She accepts all pain as 
part of her condition. She has an unconscious need for punish-
ment, connected with the fact that her original sadism has turned 
inwards to become masochism, . . . She is faithful to her feelings, 
and she has no especially strong superego, which is demonstrated 
by her accepting no morality except what at any given moment she 
feels most fits the occasion. She is basically a narcissistic creature 
reflecting her body and feelings, but she has learnt that she is for-
bidden to touch her clitoris. She can play with women, but only 
give herself, and thus know fulfillment as a woman, with men .... 
o becomes the image of the natural woman and many readers will 
feel (whether they dare admit it openly or not) that it is good and 
right ... and that all genuine women belong there . . . . Readers 
will feel all that, and trust their feelings, for feelings are natural, and 
anyone who doubts feelings, and starts talking about feelings being 
influenced by external forces, is at best a cold and bloodless crea-
ture in the clutches of the intellect.6o 
The analysis would be fine and comfortable if it stopped there; but it 
does not. Marcus does not simply condemn 0 and the society that 
created her. She has an intensely empathic and sexual response to 
The Story of 0: 
When I first read The Story of 0, it filled me with a mixture of sexual 
excitement, horror, anxiety-and envy. I read it many times, each 
time with the same feelings. But gradually, as I had the good for-
tune to plunge to some extent into acting out an "Imitation of 0," 
my envy, anyhow, lessened, because on one (sic) imitates 0 with 
overstepping a boundary into a state which is not particularly 
enviable. 
58. Id. at 204. 
59. Id. at 209. 
60. Id. at 206-07. 
HeinOnline -- 15 Wis. Women’s L.J. 190 2000
190 WISCONSIN WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:149 
But I must still say that Pauline Reage is right-the description is 
correct and I understand O. I understand her pride in the weals 
from the whip. .. He owns me. I'm worth owning. Look what he 
makes me put up with. Look how strong the man who loves me is. 
Look I'm valuable. I exist. I understand that 0 comes to feel an 
inner peace, strength, dignity, security and psychic energy in this 
particular way, an energy that is nothing like anything else I (0) 
knoW.61 
The Story of 0, Marcus concludes, is the text with which radical feminists 
must concern themselves, and the magnitude of female readers' re-
sponsive, empathic and erotic response to the text is the issue with 
which radical feminism must come to grips. 62 
Radical feminists have responded, I believe, to the conflict be-
tween pleasure and ideal posed by the undeniable female eroticiza-
tion of sexual submission in three characteristic ways. First, some 
feminists claim that there is no conflict between stated ideal and felt 
pleasure because feminist consciousness-raising-properly under-
stood-has revealed the falsity of these pleasures. Thus there is no 
contradiction between feminist methodology-consciousness rais-
ing-and feminist goal-sexual equality. What the methodology 
reveals is that the pleasure had in sexual submission is false. Justine 
Jones, an English radical feminist, accounts in the following passage 
for her own masochism: 
Our sexuality has been constructed by male-dominated society. We 
are brought up to kow-tow to men in every area of our lives, accept a 
generally lousy deal in jobs, pay, etc., etc. . . . How can sexuality 
possibly escape? We have to fight to begin to define it for ourselves, 
just as we have to fight for everything else that's ours that has been 
taken away from us, ... control over our bodies, our fertility, our 
right to do any sort of paid work, a culture of our own .. 
Relating sexually to women, or being a celibate lesbian, I still some-
times have masochistic fantasies. I hate them and fight to accept I'm 
not alone, nor a pervert. I don't believe the answer is to welcome 
and revel in them as "natural," I don't think they come from my 
own self-definition of my sexuality. I think they were granted and 
grew there as I grew up as a means of adapting my sexuality to the 
demands of a heterosexist society where men are supremely in con-
trol .... 
So-my sexuality, and that of many other women, was twisted into 
masochism, which came out most strongly in my fantasies, which 
made me enjoy being screwed, which gave me an extra thrill. Many 
women have been turned on by "The Story of 0." Many of us have 
carried our fantasies into reality, have put up with or indeed initi-
ated extremely humiliating sexual practices with men, . . . . What 
about the way this humiliation carries over into everyday life with 
61. Id. at 207. 
62. Id. at 209. 
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men, how we allow ourselves to be treated like slaves, insulted,joked 
about? Who could "enjoy being a girl" with all that implies now, 
unless she was helped along by masochism?63 
191 
In a similar vein, "danu" states in a working paper on lesbian sado-
masochism (prepared for the WAVAW conference): 
In our masochistic fantasies, many women strive to reconcile the 
impossible: to feel pleasure (men's) and pain (women's) at the 
same time: that is, sexual pleasure (men's) and bodily pain (wo-
men's). In our fantasies, many of us become sexually aroused and 
enjoy rape, torture. We strive to enjoy what men enjoy-believing 
that thereby we shall sUIvive.64 
The second response (which was, until very recently, the near-
standard feminist response) is simply to abandon feminist methodol-
ogy. One way of maintaining the ideals of freedom and equality is by 
abandoning whatever methodology brought you to the conclusion 
that you enjoy being a sexual slave. If that methodology is feminist 
consciousness-raising, then so much the worse for consciousness-rais-
ing. Thus, in her response to Pat Califia's defense of lesbian sado-
masochism (that it is (1) consensual; (2) rebellious; and (3) 
threatened) ,65 Jayne Eagerton abandons entirely the first person nar-
rative voice which is the distinction of consciousness-raising as moral 
method and adopts instead an outsider's condemnatory voice: 
I don't find any of the arguments convincing. The endless images 
of fist fucking, flagellation, bondage and leather sex which come 
flooding into my mind when I read about lesbian S&M are irrevoca-
bly associated with male power and female powerlessness. It is im-
possible to divorce the concepts of domination and submission 
from the sexual relationships between men and women. That is 
where they come from. What of all those women who are forced 
into humiliating and painful sex with men-women who have no 
'choice'. It seems that these lesbians are parodying the reality of 
this oppression and diffusing its significance. They play games 
while other women suffer. I think sado-masochism takes the hetero-
sexual model and mimics and exaggerates all its horrors and ine-
qualities. It both reflects and reenforces men's power over women. 
How can we hope to fight male power when we are practicing male 
defined sexuality among ourselves?66 
The third possible response to the conflict between the pleasure 
we take in erotic domination and our equalitarian ideals is to put our 
63. WAVAW, supra n.25, at 56-57. 
64. Id. at 225. 
65. See P. Califia, Sapphistry: The Book Of Lesbian Sexuality (1980). See also 
Deirdre English, Amber Hollibaugh and Gayle Rubin, TalR.ing Sex, 58 Socialist Review 
(1981) and Rubin, Sexual Fringe, supra nA9. Califia and Rubin's arguments are sum-
marized, and categorized as "libertarian feminist," in Ann Furgerson's excellent re-
view essay of the pornography debate in Pleasure, Power and the Porn War.s, Vol. 3 No.8 
Woman's Review Of Books 11 (1986). 
66. WAVAWat 212-13. 
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ideals in abeyance-maybe they are what is false-and hold true to 
consciousness-raising. This is the position for which I will argue. First 
I want to comment on the two feminist responses which I think fail. 
What I have identified as the first response-the dismissal of the 
desire for erotic submission and the pleasure obtained from it, as in-
stances of false consciousness as revealed by consciousness-raising itself-
is, I believe, wildly out of line with the methodology of consciousness-
raising, as that method is more widely understood in feminist practice. 
There is a striking-and revealing-discontinuity between the criteria 
by which fantasies of erotic submission are judged as "false," and the 
criteria by which other felt desires are discovered through conscious-
ness-raising to be "false." Feminist consciousness-raising, and the cor-
relative meaning of "false" in the phrase "false-consciousness," is 
governed, I believe, by three methodological principles. First, a wo-
man discovers the "falsity" of her felt pleasures and desires in con-
sciousness-raising when she discovers that they are not her own-when she 
discovers, quite literally, that she has been seeking the pleasure of 
others, not herself. The desire, and the pleasure had from the de-
sire's satisfaction, is subjected to a test of source, not substance: whose 
desire is it? Whose pleasure is it? Second, she discovers the "falsity" of 
her desires when she discovers, again quite literally, that she has been 
lying, either to herself or others. Thus, the desire and its attendant 
pleasure is tested by reference to its genuineness, not its substance-is it 
truth or falsehood? The desire (or the pleasure) is discovered to be 
"false" when she discovers that what she has been calling "desirable" is 
not in fact-to her--desirable. And third, and perhaps most centrally, 
she discovers the "falsity" of her desires when she herself-not outside 
observers-feels their falsity. It is when the subject herself discovers 
the disjunction between her purported desire and her discovered 
identity that the desire is felt to be false and is rightly abandoned. 
The feminist position that the desire for and pleasure obtained in 
erotic submission are "false," I believe, flagrantly violates all three of 
these methodological principles. First, the judgment that women's 
desires for erotic submission are "false" is typically made by reference 
to the content of those desires, not their source. The desire for er-
oticized submission is false because of the content of the desire itself, 
not because it has been discovered to constitute, in masked form, the 
desires of others. Second, the desire is judged false not because it is 
determined to be a lie-not truly felt to be pleasurable but only re-
ported as such-but solely because of its content, solely because it is a 
desire for sexual submission. And, finally and most revealingly, with 
the noteworthy exception of Justine's and Danu's statements quoted 
above, the discovery of the falsity of these desires has not typically 
come from the women who have them, but almost always from the 
women who do not. The desire is judged to be false, not because the 
subject herself has come to feel it as false, but because someone else 
has come to judge it as such. The judgment of falsehood is almost 
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always agamst the will as well as the opmIOn of the woman who has the 
deSIre. ThIs truly IS a profound departure from femmist methodology 
WhICh IS also truly offenSIve-conscIOusness-raIsmg IS not about the 
Impositlon of Judgments of truth or falsIty on the deSIres of others. 
I do not believe that on the basIS of a truly femmist conSCIOusness-
raIsmg methodology these deSIres would mevItably be discovered to 
be false. First, they do not nng of the "gtvmg self." The women who 
have deSIres for, construct fantasIes of, and take pleasure m erotlc sub-
mISSIOn are rather clearly expressmg deSIres, fantasIes and pleasures 
that are theIr own. In Mana Marcus's descnptlon of her own expen-
ence, and her ambIvalent response to It, for example, there IS nothmg 
to suggest anythmg other than full ownershIp of eIther the deSIre or 
the ultlmate pleasure: 
Then one day he was there, my Black Pnnce-my dream lover, 
the sadist,Just like m faIry tales when someone waves a wand. Every-
thmg went of Its own accord. I didn't even have to provoke hIm. 
He did everythmg I had hoped for m my fantasIes. He spoke qUIetly 
and menacmgly and he beat me, and while m bed, forced me to do 
humiliatmg thmgs. I was taken up as hIgh as never before. 
But not qUIte to the top. 
I was completely disonented when thIS was repeated several 
tImes. I was even more disonented when shortly after that, I had 
my first orgasm. An orgasm wlthm marnage, after nearly twenty 
years of actIve sexual life, after expenencmg childbIrth and achlev-
mg professIOnal success. 
I kept wondenng what It all meant. 
First of all, a colossal tenSIOn had been released. The mIracle 
had happened and the pnnce had been there He had opened 
a door mto that forbIdden room for me. 
Secondly, I am sure that pnnce of mme took me to places 
where I had never been before, probably nght to the begmmng of 
the path and perhaps even qUIte a way up It-SO hIgh up that for 
the first tIme I didn't Immediately regtster It conscIOusly, I thmk 
that glimpse etched Itself m so that I did not forget It agam. 67 
It could, of course, be argued that fantasIes of erotlc dommatlon 
are "false" for the straIghtforward reason that theIr verbal artlculatlon 
reveals them to be such. Pleasure IS not pam-they are Opposites-
and anyone who confuses the two IS for that reason alone sustammg 
false deSIres. Antl-S&M femmISts, to theIr credit, do not typIcally 
make thIS linguIStlC or logtcal argument, but It may nevertheless be 
worth commentlng on. In short, the hedomc descnptlons-gleaned 
from both conscIOuSneSS-raIsmg and traditlonal therapeutlc con-
texts-do not bear thIS charge out. Practicmg sexual masochISts may 
be, m our culture, smgularly unconfused about the relatlonship of 
pleasure and pam and the difference between the two of them. Mar-
cus describes her expenence of thIS purported contradictlon thus: 
67 Marcus, supra n.50, at 118-19. 
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I found . that if physical pain is to be used directly as sexual 
stimulation, then it has to be on a defined and strictly limited level. 
Perhaps this is not true of everyone, but it certainly was for me. If 
anything hurts really badly, there is no room for pleasure. Then I 
cannot think of anything else except that it hurts and ought to stop, 
and that I must get away. If it doesn't really hurt, nothing happens. 
The ideal pain should be governed by a computer that ensures it 
stops just within that tiny area when it becomes sexual pleasure. 
This hair-line balance is easy enough to achieve in the imagination, 
but in real life it is almost impossible. So in reality I had to write off 
pain as a direct stimulant. 
But not as an indirect one. I got as far as realizing that the coveted 
state was outside the actual pain. Pain is a necessary part of it, but 
because the mechanism is so finely graded and the balance so hope-
less to achieve, the pain is active only outside the actual situation-
before and after. It has to be passed. There has to be a moment 
when I hate and loathe the pain, and only wish I could get away 
from it. But once you have been on the pain-level, it can be used 
sexually at another moment in time. 
When it really hurts seriously, the sexual connection practically 
ceases-when, for instance, you're beaten with some object or 
other. But before and after, there is plenty of opportunity for sex-
ual use of the situation. There is sexual stimulation in the memory 
. . . or in the threat . . . and perhaps in combination . . . . This 
assumes that you have already tried out pain on your body ... , It is 
only the pain you hate that can be manipulated in a certain way so 
that it may become sexual stimulation.68 
The crux of the feminist claim that the pleasure had in fantasies 
and enactment of erotic submission is "false" is not that the pleasure is 
logically incoherent. It is that the pleasure is quite literally false, not 
contradictory: submission is felt to be pleasurable, but it is not. Submis-
sion is thought to be desirable, but it is not. The pleasure is therefore on 
some level a lie, either to others or oneself. And yet, if we examine 
the accounts of the pleasure had in erotic submission and domination 
for indicia of lying by any criterion other than content, the charge is 
singularly hard to substantiate. In this passage, Maria Marcus elabo-
rates on O's enjoyment of her submission, and Marcus' own identifica-
tion with that enjoyment: 
What [0] finds is that she is becoming happier and happier, happy 
over the way she is being used, happy over being whipped, happy 
over not being allowed to speak and happy not to move .... 
How can she describe the joy, the inner peace and dignity and 
cleanliness she feels after being whipped and soiled by the sweat 
and semen of the men and her tears? ... 
68. Id. at 119-120. 
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At one moment, 0 is standing naked in a room, two men looking at 
her, and she is waiting obediently for them to give her orders. But 
something is wrong. She looks appealingly up to Sir Stephen: 
He understood what the trouble was, smiled, came up to her 
and, taking her two hands, drew them behind her back and 
held them pinioned there in one of his. She slid back against 
him, her eyes shut, and it was in a dream .... 
Not until the moment 0(1) becomes freed of her body, of the use 
of her arms, of the right to decide for herself, of the right of her 
own desires-not until the moment 1(0) lose my identity, do I find 
my own identity. Not until that moment is there no longer anything 
to doubt. Not until that moment have I found my place in a system 
. . . . At last I can be secure, strong, bold, proud, clean, filled vvith a 
great inner peace. At last I find myself-because I have lost myself. 
At last I have become-O. 
O-a letter, impersonal, the name of anyone. 
O-a whole, eternally accessible to men; 0, a sexual symbol, a 
symbol that women are for men to empty themselves into. 
O-an object, a creature that can only be dealt with. 
O-a zero, a creature with no identity. 
O-the complete form, the circle that encloses the world, that 
finally contains the world inside it; 0, the banishing point, back to 
the womb, into the peace of non-existence-death.69 
195 
There is much to be disturbed about in this passage, both in O's 
reaction and in Marcus's, but I do not spot any lies. 
Most radical feminists, however, who have endorsed the dismissal 
of fantasies of erotic domination, have justified that dismissal not by 
reference to criteria stemming from feminist methodology at all, but 
by reference to feminist and supra-feminist substantive normative 
standards. To these feminists, (I think) the bringing to consciousness 
of the pleasure women feel in erotic submission simply represents the 
limits of consciousness-raising as feminist methodology. That the dis-
missal of pleasure cannot be justified by reference to the methodolog-
ical criteria of consciousness-raising represents not an argument 
against the dismissal of pleasure, but an argument for abandoning, at 
precisely that point, the methodology. Thus, it is simply not the case 
that we should validate whatever emerges in consciousness-raising; 
there are and should be external criteria or external norms-such as 
equality or autonomy-by which the content of our pleasures and 
desires should be judged. Those norms, in turn, are derived not from 
our felt pleasures-even when those pleasures are fully and correctly 
identified as our own-but from our political ideals. Where felt plea-
sure conflicts with derived ideal, ideal must trump; where feminist 
method reveals anti-feminist pleasure, feminist method must cease. 
In short, if we desire sexual submission, then so much the worse for 
the primacy of desire, even if-especially if-those desires are re-
69. Id. at 202-04. 
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vealed to us through feminist consciousness-raising as being very 
much our own. 
Marcus eventually endorses something like this position. Her ul-
timate suggestion for the fate of female sexual masochism reflects a 
strongly felt moral and even medical judgment that the pleasure, if 
incorrect, must go: 
Even if we are cured of our authoritarian masochism, we may still 
suffer some sexual masochism. As long as we do, it will also be used 
to keep us down, and it will be interpreted as evidence that inwardly 
we long to submit ourselves to a ruling power. And many women 
may retain their faith in the link with authoritarian masochism. So 
if for no other reason, we should do something about it together. 
We should try to analyze the origins of sexual masochism, and even if 
we cannot, still try to find out how to cure it-in ourselves and in others. 
We could set up self-help groups with the aim of mapping muscular 
tensions that arise when we become sexually stimulated, with or 
without masochistic elements. We could try to divert sexual arousal 
so that it does not have to take the route through the head, en-
abling it to spread unhindered to our soft relaxed receptive sexual 
organs, without being soiled by fantasies that we feel are destructive and 
degrading. 
I think we should plump for the physical way, because the psychic 
way is so intangible and complicated that it would demand too 
much of us. But together, in groups, we might be able to cope with 
the physical track, in the way we have learned to cope with so much 
else. 
If we do it together, we may learn to cope with the violent physical 
dramas that would presumably take place when resistance is swept 
away and orgasm threatens to break right through. For we know 
each other and we know ourselves .... 
The aim must be to allocate our problems-our female masochism-their 
right place and no more . ... [W]e have to deal with sexual masochism and 
if possible dispose of it-not because it is shameful, but because in it-
self it is muck we can well do without . .. , I will try to be cured of my sexual 
masochism, or else to live with it without feeling compromised when 
faced with the women's movement or the rest of the world.70 
This abandonment of consciousness-raising as method and its 
concomitant dismissal of women's internal lives as a criterion of value 
in favor of an objective political agenda has at least three costs. First, 
it has already done and will continue to do enormous damage to our 
integrity. As Adrienne Rich has eloquently argued, one of women's 
most disabling problems is that women lie.7I For a multitude of rea-
sons, we lie to ourselves and to others. And, one thing women lie 
about more than any other, perhaps, is the quality and content of our 
own hedonic lives. We tell others we are happy when we are not; we 
70. [d. at 252-60. 
71. A. Rich, On Lies, Secrets, And Silence: Selected Prose 1966-1978 (1979). 
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tell others that our marriages are good when they are in fact brutal; 
we tell others we are orgasmic when we are not; we tell others we are 
sexually fulfilled when we are deprived. We smile on the street-we 
express pleasure-when we are being threatened and feeling pain. 
One reason we lie, perhaps more than any other, is to fulfill the politi-
cally dictated expectations of others. We say we are flattered, happy, 
fulfilled, orgasmic, because the social and political· visions of others 
demand that we should be so. This lying has hurt us. We lie so often 
we don't know when we are doing it. We lie so often we lack the sense 
of internal identity necessary to the identification of a proposition's 
truth or falsity. We lie so often that we lack a self who lies. We just are 
lies; we inhabit falsehood. Our lives are themselves lies. 
Consciousness-raising, more than any other feminist methodol-
ogy, has given women a means by which to break the chain of decep-
tion in which we live. By learning to identify the falsehoods we utter, 
we have learned to create a self who can assert a truth. Consciousness-
raising is the discovery of the power of truth, not just a truth. When we 
abandon consciousness-raising we run the risk of losing truth. We run 
a high risk of losing ourselves again in yet another morass of decep-
tion. We run the risk of once again living a lie. We run the risk of 
once again having to feel subjectively what it is forbidden to be objec-
tively, and we will once again end up paying the piper. I am not will-
ing to take that risk. 
Second, if feminists abandon consciousness-raising as a method 
in favor of an authoritatively pronounced objective ideal, many wo-
men will pay by foregoing a source of sexual pleasure. This is not a 
trivial sacrifice. When we deny what gives us sexual pleasure, and 
when we thereby deny ourselves that sexual pleasure itself-when we 
deny both truth and pleasure-we deny not just one but two impor-
tant aspects of our selves. We become, yet again, not entitled; this 
time-and, let's not forget, not for the first time-not entitled to sex-
ual pleasure. We become, once again, sexually errant. [God damn: 
Wrong again!] We become, if we forego the sexual pleasure we have 
learned to own, once again, the conveyors of sexual pleasure for 
others, and once again, our role will be dictated by someone else's 
conception of sexual right and wrong. 
Third, if we give up on feminist consciousness-raising, we will be 
giving up a method of self-creation that has, for many women, worked. 
We have learned through consciousness-raising to trust our exper-
iences. We have learned to give meaning to those experiences, and to 
validate the meanings they teach. We have learned to assert hidden 
experiences as meaningful-full of meaning. By giving meaning to 
the past, we have acquired some sense of control of the future. If we 
now shift ground-if we now begin to test the validity of our lived 
experiences by reference to political ideals-we run the risk of forget-
ting. We run the risk of forgetting the exhilaration of self-affirmation 
and sel£.creation. We run the risk of forgetting the pleasure of shared 
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trust. We run the risk of forgetting the importance of learning to 
identify, acknowledge and act on the desires we have painstakingly 
learned to honor as our own. We run the risk of giving ourselves once 
again, this time for principle rather than protection. 
So-the third response to the problem posed by women's enjoy-
ment of erotic submission, endorsed by a small but growing number 
of radical feminists, is to understand rather than judge these pleasures 
in their historical context and in their full experiential truth. The 
first requires study of history; the latter requires information which 
can only be gained through consciousness-raising, and with no polit-
ical prejudgments. Such an understanding, I believe, is essential to 
any dynamic future for radical feminism. First, only by such a process 
will we achieve any meaningful understanding of these pleasures, but 
we will not achieve that so long as we allow stated ideals to trump and 
silence felt pleasure. But second, I believe, only by understanding our 
felt pleasures will we achieve any meaningful understanding of our 
stated ideals. We cannot possibly give content to the substantive 
equality we seek until we understand the erotic appeal of submission. 
If we can identify what human needs are met through eroticized sub-
mission, perhaps we can better understand, and identify, the human 
needs which will be met or frustrated through political, legal and eco-
nomic equality. 
Jessica Benjamin describes the danger of this explanatory and 
non judgmental approach: 
[An analysis of the controlled, ritualized, rational form of violence 
characteristic of sadomasochism] is probably not applicable to all 
forms of violence, or even all male violence against women. . . . 
There are a great many other forms of violence against women 
which do not partake of this rational character, in which women are 
simply assaulted and cannot successfully defend themselves. The 
danger is that even in such cases women blame themselves and feel 
guilty for prosecuting the assailant. This makes the topic of rational 
violence or erotic domination, where participation is voluntary or 
only a fantasy, seem to some a subtle apology for all male violence.72 
She then warns of a deadened future if we fail to meet the danger: 
A politics that denies these issues, that tries to sanitize or rationalize 
the erotic, fantastic components of human life, will not defeat domi-
nation, but only play into it. The power of a fantasy, the fantasy of 
rational violence, must be attributed to the interplay of great social 
forces and deep human needs. Finding the means to dissolve that 
fantasy, so as to tolerate the tension between true differentiation 
and mutual recognition, will be no easy achievement.73 
72. Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Rational Violence and Erotic Domination, in H. 
Eisenstein & A. Jardine, The Future Of Difference, 42 (1985). 
73. Id. at 66. 
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On this issue no less than any other, women must face the high 
risks posed by honesty if we are going to avoid the sure death that is 
self-deception. 
2. The Erotic Appeal of Submission 
I believe that sexual submission has erotic appeal and value when 
it is an expression of trust; is damaging, injurious and painful when it 
is an expression of fear, and is dangerous because of its ambiguity: both 
others and we ourselves have difficulty in disentangling the two. 
Here, I want to emphasize-I hope not overemphasize-the value of 
sexual submission when it is an expression of trust, because that, I 
believe, is the source of the pleasure women find in voluntary and 
fantasized erotic submission, in all of its forms. Absolutely pliant obe-
dience-the willingness to transform one's subjectivity into another's 
object-is sexually arousing (for some) when it enables the submissive 
subject to transcend her own selfhood, and thereby to abdicate her 
responsibility for her own action. That this total abdication of respon-
sibility can be erotic, I think, reflects a genuine human truth and a 
deep human need. It can be pleasurable and exhilarating and some-
times so much so that it is sexually stimulating to forego authorship of 
one's actions. When we grant power to another to control-to au-
thor-our acts, that grant may, and I have argued often does, express 
a deep seated and forgotten (or not so forgotten) fear. But it might 
not. It might also express our total trust in that other. That "other" 
might be trustworthy. That placing trust in one who is stronger is felt 
by some to be intensely pleasurable, and that the fantasy of doing just 
that is felt by many more to be so, should teach us something. 
Jessica Benjamin's powerful interpretation of The Story of 0 is 
complex, but on this central point (I think) she is in agreement. 
Thus, Benjamin says of 0: 
The Story of 0 is an exceedingly self-conscious attempt to represent 
the ... tension between separation and recognition, rationality and 
violence, transcendence and negation of self . . . . Perhaps the 
greatest objection to this work is its emphasis on O's voluntary sub-
mission. But it is only by virtue of O's volition that the allegory of 
the struggle for recognition can unfold .... 
The novel makes clear that behind the physical humiliation and 
abuse which 0 suffers is a search for an ultimately unattainable spir-
itual or psychological satisfaction. De Beauvoir pointed out that 
real masochism is wanting the suffering of pain not for its own sake, 
but as proof of servitude. That is, masochism is essentially a desire 
for subordination rather than . . . the experience of pain as such 
. . . . She also distinguishes this submissive impulse from the im-
pulse to transcend the self by giving oneself to another person .... 
This distinction is crucial, as long as we see the relation between the 
two values. The submissive impulse stands in relation to real tran-
scendence as the part to the whole .... 
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Ifwe accept the idea that O's consent to pain and enslavement is a 
search for transcendence, we still want to know why she chooses this 
form, rather than the possibility of mutual, reciprocal giving of self. 
[The answer may be that the form she chooses] allows one partner 
to remain rational and in control, while the other loses her bounda-
ries. In fact, it is the master's rational, calculating, even instru-
mentalizing attitude which excites submission . . . . The pleasure, 
for both partners, is in his mastery. Were both partners to give up 
self, ... this disorganization of self would be total. . .. 0 could not 
then experience her loss of control as a controlled loss. She could 
not safely give in to her urge to lose control. 74 
Benjamin concludes: 
I believe that we are facing unbearably intensified privatization and 
discontinuity, unrelieved by expressions of continuity. Given that 
social structure and instrumental culture enforce individual isola-
tion so rigidly, the transgression which attempts to break it may nec-
essarily be more violent. . . . The more rigid and tenacious the 
boundary between individuals and the more responsible each indi-
vidual for maintaining it, the greater the danger it will collapse. If 
the sense of boundary is established by physical, bodily separation, 
then sexual and physical violence (if not in reality, in fantasy) are 
experienced as ways of breaking the boundary. The fantasy as well as 
the playing out of rational violence does offer a controlled fonn of transcen-
dence, the promise of the real thing. Sadomasochistic imagery may be popu-
lar because it embodies this promise of transcendence without its fearful 
reality. Similarly, if masochists far outnumber sadists, it may be be-
cause people are in flight from discontinuity and rationality-espe-
cially men who have been charged with upholding it. The rejection 
of male rationality and control by men has become at least thinka-
ble, because it represents an intolerable strain. 
Beneath the sensationalism of power and powerlessness, the yearning to know 
and be known lies numbed.75 
Are the desires to "know and be known," to trust another, to 
blend in identity, at least sometimes expressed in the eroticization of 
submission and dominance, of any value, and do they express any-
thing of value? Or are they soiled by their extremity, by their expres-
sion in forms which implicate "sweat and semen," whips and whip 
lashes, marks of obedience, and of objectification? It's a close question. 
When (u ever) and why (if ever) are these desires and the pleasure felt 
in their satiation beautiful? When are they not "muck we could well 
do without"? If they cannot, as 1 have argued they cannot, be entirely 
dismissed as false, can they be in any sense affirmed as truth? Do they 
express a political truth? Minimally, as (I think) Jessica Benjamin has 
argued, they remind us of the hedonistic limits-the limits of plea-
sure, pain and desire-upon the otherwise near relentless quest by 
74. ld. at 53-58. 
75. !d. at 65. 
HeinOnline -- 15 Wis. Women’s L.J. 201 2000
2000] DIFFERENCE IN WOMEN'S HEDONIC LIVES 201 
both feminists and non-feminists of the fruits of liberal individual-
ism-of subjective autonomy, of severe differentiation, and, in Benja-
min's language, of "discontinuity and rationality."76 That so many 
women and more than a few men undeniably take pleasure in control 
objectification may be testimony to the limit of the desirability of the 
pure subjectivism endorsed by virtually all forms of liberalism, includ-
ing feminist liberal legalism. In a parallel fashion, the fact that many 
women and more than a few men take pleasure from sexual submis-
sion can be read as a critique of the absolutist commitment to substan-
tive equality endorsed by radical legalism of all forms, including 
feminist radical legalism. The trust expressed by the submissive party 
in a controlled and unequal sexual encounter is such a high pleasure 
that it is erotic. That fact-that the trust felt by the submissive party in 
controlled inequality is pleasurable-should seIVe to remind us that to 
the extent that absolute equality comes at the cost of the trust of 
which human beings are capable, often expressed in the consensual 
abandonment of autonomy and relinquishment of control over one-
self to another, that equality will come at a high cost. 
The political lesson of the pleasure in eroticized submission is not 
that we should forsake either individualism or equality as ultimately 
"undesirable." But there is no discontinuity here: noris it the case that 
the woman who enjoys fantasies of erotic domination would enjoy lit-
eral servitude, or for that matter thinks she would. The lesson-the 
truth-of the erotic pleasure many feel in controlled submission may 
be this: while we crave liberal autonomy and radical equality, while we 
crave the freedom which the liberal feminist pursues and the equality 
the radical feminist envisions, at least in this society as it is presently consti-
tuted, we also crave-because we also need-the capacity to trust one another, 
including those who are stronger than we are. The weak and the strong are 
in fact interdependent in this society-we aren't equally autonomous 
individuals-and what that means is that the weak need to be able to 
depend on the strong. The capacity to safely depend on another, to 
look after one's own well-being, is a desirable state, and it is no great 
mystery that it is pursued as pleasure. When we test the limits of our 
capacity to trust, of our willingness to embrace absolute dependency, 
and when we discover erotic pleasure lurking at that limit, we give 
expression to our desire to be able to trust someone who is strong and 
trustworthy-which may be a fully human, and not just female, need. 
Either trust or fear can prompt us to submit to the will of the 
other. Trust is enlivening, and fear is deadening. There is a differ-
ence. It is a subjective, internal, hedonic difference. It is the differ-
ence between the battered woman's consensual endurance-
motivated by fear-of beatings, and the lover's consensual enjoy-
ment-motivated by trust-of controlled submission. The first sub-
mission is deadening, the second (can be) enlivening. It is a 
76. [d. 
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difference we will only be able to see, much less understand, if we look 
at our internal lives. From an external perspective, this difference is 
muted. From an internal perspective, it is glaring. 
There is-of course---a danger in this. The internal difference is 
not inevitably glaring, even to ourselves. And because it is not, there is 
a danger in the pleasure of submission just as there is a limit to the 
desirability in the non-sexual world of relationships of dependence 
and trust. To return to The Story of 0, 0 pays for her pleasure with her 
life. As Marcus reminds us, "If it were ever a good trip it ends as a bad 
one." Any reading of 0, Marcus rightly insists, which celebrates the 
very good trip at the beginning, but fails to come to grips with the very 
bad trip at the end, is a betrayal of 0: 
[It] is a game with high stakes, and you never get anything for noth-
ing. 0 does not know this. But Pauline Reage knows very well, 
which is why The Stary Of 0 is such a strong book, because she shows 
both sides, the gains and the losses. 
How does 0 pay? 
She sells with her own body, the right to her own body, her own 
pleasure. She sells her ability to speak. . . . She sells her relations 
with other people, for she lives isolated from the world about her. 
She particularly sells her relations with other women, for she can 
only betray them. . .. She sells her ability to stand on her own. She 
sells her ability to act, and her will, her responsibility and her indi-
viduality. She sells her emotions and finally her own death. She has 
nothing left. 
And what does she get for it? Is her story one of a mystic experi-
ence, a consciousness-expanding trip? . . . Is it the old story about 
having to lose yourself in order to find yourself? 
Beneath those stares, beneath those hands, beneath those sexes 
which raped her, beneath those lashes which tore her, she sank, lost 
in a delirious absence from herself. . .. She was-who? Anyone at 
all, no one. 
On the way, 0 feels a security she cannot do without and cannot 
acquire in any other way. But at the bitter end, she is alone, dis-
guised as an animal, ... dumb, without feeling. If it were ever a 
good trip, it ends as a bad one. She has given herself up and has 
received nothing in exchange. Only the rest of them have gained.77 
At the end of the story, 0 is dead, but her subjectivity dies long 
before that "bitter end," as has, I suspect, most women's erotic enjoy-
ment of her exploits. At some point 0 becomes a real slave, not a 
play-slave, and I suspect it is at that point that, for most female read-
ers, the book loses its erotic appeal and becomes a nightmare. At 
some point, 0 becomes entirely devoid of subjectivity-at some point 
she can no longer control her relinquishment of self. But this leaves 
questions, not grounds for condemnation. At what point does the 
77. Marcus, supra n.50, at 207-08. 
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pleasure become deadly? Is the ending true to the character develop-
ment that preceded it? Are we running the risk that 0 runs ifwe take 
pleasure in her exploits? In our own lives, at what point should we 
unequivocally seek to disown-to shed-our pleasures as coming with 
too high a risk of danger? When the pleasure is no longer pleasure-
when it is no longer backed by trust? When it has given way to a 
numbing terror-when it is backed by fear? Or at an earlier point, 
when we suspect that such a transformation might occur? Or even at 
an earlier point, when in someone else's judgment, such transforma-
tion might occur? 
I believe these questions should be undertaken and answered. At 
some point in O's progression, she crosses a volitional threshold: at 
some point she is no longer able to leave. At some point she also 
crosses a hedonic threshold: at some point she no longer feels plea-
sure. If we can specify when and why that occurs, we can better under-
stand why her story (up until that point) is so erotic, as well as why her 
story (past that point) is so frightening. Ifwe do that, I believe, we will 
better understand the reason we take pleasure in sexual submission, 
and that understanding, in tum, may lead us to a deeper understand-
ing of the value of trust and submission. More importantly, it will clar-
ify the danger, evidenced by our empathic and frightened response to 
O's eventual enslavement and death, of sexual submission past the 
threshold. That understanding, in tum, can only clarify the basis of 
our pure political commitment to equality. 
B. Radical Feminist Legal Reform: The Pornography Debate 
As I said at the outset of this section, the radical feminist legal 
theorist's refusal to engage in phenomenological critique of the ideal 
she proposes-substantive equality-is usually benign, for the 
straightfonvard reason that generally there is no conflict between our 
felt pleasures-once we have correctly identified them-and radical 
feminist ideals of political and substantive equality. Occasionally, 
though, the radical legalist's refusal to check stated objective ideal 
against felt subjective pleasure will result in a misfire. The Indianapo-
lis anti-pornography ordinance is a now notorious instance of just 
such a misfire. 
Catharine MacKinnon asks, again and again, why feminists are 
defending the rights of pornographers.78 The question may not be 
very nice, but it is a very good one: if the ordinance offends the first 
amendment rights of pornographers, let the ACLU make the argu-
ment. I believe that the first amendment issue for feminists is a sin-
cerely felt feminist concern-the FACT (Feminists Against Censorship 
Taskforce) women, I'm sure, do genuinely fear that censorship will 
78. At the 1985 National Conference for Women and the Law, as well as in any 
number of other forums. She has not, to my knowledge, addressed the issue in print, 
but I might be wrong. 
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hurt women (as opposed to hurting pornographers) more than por-
nography hurts women, and they may be right.79 I also believe, 
though, that the First Amendment is not the only reason feminists are 
opposing the ordinance. I want to suggest another reason why femi-
nists may be lining up in opposition to this ordinance, and, thereby, 
how we might repair the damage. 
The ordinance and the theory behind it defines and targets por-
nography as the subordination of women through sexually explicit 
graphic or textual means.80 Subordination is (unfortunately) not de-
fined, but nevertheless, the ordinance rests on the clear normative 
premise that it is bad.81 Furthermore, to "submit" is to consent to 
one's subordination. Sexual submission, then, is likewise bad. More 
directly, sexual submission is bad because submission itself is bad, and 
submission is bad because equality is good, and equality is good be-
cause people, definitionally, simply are such that equality is good. Yet 
many women-including some feminists, and including some lesbi-
ans-don't feel sexual submission as bad. In fact, many women feel 
sexual submission as pleasurable, as so pleasurable as to be erotic, and 
as so erotic as to be orgasmic. And many women have come to this 
understanding of themselves and of their pleasure through conscious-
ness-raising sessions. The anti-pornography ordinance has defined 
the depiction or expression of sexual submission as objectively bad, 
when for many women both the thing expressed and its expression is 
subjectively pleasurable. The ordinance raises the conflict between 
objective ideal and subjective pleasure, and the result has been chaos. 
First, a historical reminder-it was not always thus. When the 
anti-pornography campaign commenced in the late seventies and 
early eighties, there was widespread feminist consensus on the evil of 
pornography. That consensus, it now goes without saying, has dis-
solved. Why? One reason might be this: in the early days of the cam-
paign feminists understood the evil of pornography to be that it 
causes violence (and more specifically sexual violence) against wo-
men.82 Now, anti-pornography advocates urge that the evil of por-
79. Being sincere, of course, is not the same thing as being right. 
80. The model ordinance I am using is reprinted as Appendix A in The MacKin-
non /Dworkin Model Anti-Pornography Law, 20 New England Law Review 759 (1985). See 
section 2 of that document. 
81. We badly need radical feminist definitions of "subordination," "submission," 
"inequality," "power" and "powerlessness." If these words are to have the normative 
meanings generally associated with them in male progressive or radical legalism, we 
need a feminist defense of that endorsement. If they mean something different, we 
need to hear the difference. Gilligan makes the same point in Buffalo Symposium, 
supra n.42, at 74. 
82. Pornography is characterized in both the model ordinance and in the Min-
neapolis and Indianapolis versions as sex discrimination and as central in creating 
and maintaining sex as a basis of discrimination. The first charge presents a highly 
controversial theory of the relation between the depiction of discrimination and dis-
crimination itself-between Little Black Sambo and racial oppression-while the lat-
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nography is not that it causes violence against women, but that it 
subordinates women, on the theory, no doubt, that the former is symp-
tom, the latter is root cause. The shift from "violence" to "subordina-
tion" has splintered the movement, for, I think, primarily the reason 
noted above-subordination is taken to be both reflected in and 
caused by sexual submission, and consensual, controlled, sexual sub-
mission, is hedonically, for many, pleasurable. 
This is the lesson I draw: we might be able to re-build a consensus 
on pornography by focusing our attention on the harm we want to 
eradicate, rather than on the classification or description of the thing 
we want to prohibit. I suggest we go back for a moment to what we 
know of our own pleasure and pain and trust it. What we all know-
and by "all" I mean, on some level, all women-to be undeniably pain-
ful is the expropriation of our sexuality which is motivated by fear--
sexual submission under threat or memory of sexual compulsion-
the ever-present threat of that expropriation, the fear which the threat 
engenders, the danger with which we consequently live, and the tor-
ture we endure when the fear proves to have been horrifically well-
grounded. When we "give" ourselves because we have been taught to 
and the teacher is fear, the "giving" is not pleasurable. It is painful. The 
transaction is neither erotic, pleasurable nor valuable; it is damaging 
and deadening. Both the coercive and the consensual relinquishment 
of control expressed in sexual relationships, which is grounded in 
fear, is damaging, painful, unpleasant, deadening, and not at all 
erotic. Relinquishment of control over one's body that is motivated 
by fear is damaging whether or not the external indicia of "consent" to the 
relationship or transfer are present. Pornographic literature that facili-
tates by legitimating either the violent expropriation of our sexuality or 
fear-induced giving so as not to be one from whom sexuality is taken, 
hurts us. It damages us. It injures us. If pornography proximately 
causes that injury and the proximity is provable, it should be civilly 
actionable. 
By contrast, the relinquishment of authority and responsibility ex-
pressed in masochistic sexual fantasy and controlled masochistic prac-
tice at least sometimes constitutes a willed sexual submission which is 
motivated by trust, not fear. When motivated by tru~t, that submission 
ter presents a counter-intuitive and counter-historical thesis about the multiple causes 
of women's oppression. 
Contrast these claims: "Pornography leads to violence against women, and is cen-
tral in maintaining sex as a basis for permissible violence." This latter claim may be 
equally controversial among feminists but it is also, I believe, more intelligible. 
Whether true or false, it does not rest on undefined terms. And, for that reason, it 
gives us a better idea of how to draw lines. I believe, for example, that sexism, "dis-
crimination," and sexuality are so pervasive in this culture that practically every depic-
tion of sexuality in the popular media fits the Minneapolis definition. But only a 
discrete subcategory of that literature even arguably causes violence. It shouldn't be 
impossible-the Meese Commission has at least made the attempt-to define the 
boundaries of that subcategory. 
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can be pleasurable, erotic, and therefore valuable. Erotic literature 
that facilitates sexual fantasies or consensual practices (or understand-
ing of those fantasies) which express and give rise to the experience of 
trust, can, I think, be pleasurable, erotic, and of value regardless of 
the content of the fantasy or the practice. 
There is no contradiction in holding both of these positions si-
multaneously. What they pose is a difficult causation question, but 
that's a far cry from being faced with a disabling contradiction between 
theory and method or ideal and pleasure: We need to know what por-
nography hurts us and endangers us and what pornography frees us 
or enlivens us. We need to know if there is no overlap (ideal), a great 
deal of overlap (worst case) or some overlap (most likely). This may 
be a very difficult factual question; it may be too difficult, but it does 
not give rise to a "contradiction." Fire too sometimes warms and 
sometimes burns. And-it is not, after all, always hard to distinguish 
the warm glow from the scorching blaze. We need to know whether 
we can differentiate and describe the sub-category of what is now over-
defined as "pornography" that hurts women by encouraging, validat-
ing or legitimating the violent expropriation through fear of our sexu-
ality. Mounting evidence suggests that violent, pictorial pornography 
does precisely that, and if so, we should pursue a world which is rid of 
it. But we should be clear: it is the injuries that pornography causes-
the violent expropriation of our sexuality-which is the "muck we can 
live without." The injury pornography causes is the expropriation, 
through violence, force, coercion, terror and fear, of our sexuality. If 
pornography injures us in this way, then we should rid ourselves of it, 
but not because it embodies or expresses a pleasure we have defined 
as undesirable. We should be rid of it because, and to the extent that, 
we discover that it hurts. 
I have no doubt that a lot of pornography injures us in just this 
way-I have no doubt that pornography can precipitate sexual vio-
lence, because it has happened to me. I know that pornography legiti-
mates sexual coercion and cruelty. I also know that women are 
coerced to participate in pornography, and I know that the violence 
depicted in pornography is, more often than we would like to think, a 
recording not a simulation of real violence. I also, though, have no 
doubt that some pornography-as it is defined under this ordi-
nance-is pleasurable to women and occasionally profoundly so. The 
depiction of sexual domination and submission is for many women 
sexually arousing, and for some women it constitutes an important 
avenue of sexual release. Women do find pleasure in sexual submis-
sion, occasionally in its graphic representation, and often in its textual 
description. The understanding and eradication of the sources of wo-
men's suffering is obviously an important feminist goal. But it is 
also-or ought to be-an important item on any feminist agenda to 
facilitate the exploration of women's sources of pleasure. Women 
take pleasure-and often, intense pleasure-in eroticized submission. 
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Whatever causes women pleasure without causing attendant pain is 
something we should celebrate, not censure. 
Empirically, we need to know what sub-category of the pornogra-
phy as it is now defined significantly contributes to the violent expro-
priation of our sexuality. The pornography that should be actionable 
is the pornography that causes the violent expropriation of our sexual-
ity-that is the injury. As the WAVAW insist: NO WOMAN WANTS 
THAT. Sexual violence, and the harm it does, is the evil facilitated, 
and sometimes proximately caused, by pornography. When we re-
spond to violence, we give ourselves in fear: that is never pleasurable 
and never felt to be such. But pornography that depicts sexual rela-
tionships of domination and submission which does not legitimate or 
encourage the violent, forced, coercive expropriation of sexuality-
even if it depicts unquestionably hierarchical sex-regardless of con-
tent and regardless of whether we call it S&M porn, butch-fern porn, 
soft-core porn, romance, or erotica-may well be relatively harmless, 
is probably a pleasure for many, and might be liberating for a few. If 
it is harmless, we ought to enjoy it if we want to, learn from it if we 
can, and othenvise leave it alone. The sexual violence that pornogra-
phy may cause-not the erotic domination it may depict-should be 
the key to what is actionable, (and whether it is actionable) for the 
simple reason that it is the sexual violence in our lives, not the erotic 
domination, which hurts us. 
I think the crisis in radical feminist legal theory which the por-
nography debate has engendered is false, for this reason. First, it is at 
least possible that on this issue we can have it both ways. Many of us 
are debating the pornography issue ,vithout having looked at much of 
it. We have a "category" in mind that might not be a sensible cate-
gory. Ifwe look at what is presently and too broadly defined as pornog-
raphy, we might discover that the pornography that hurts us-the 
pornography that contributes to the violent expropriation of our sex-
uality-is not so hard to distinguish from the pornography that 
doesn't hurt us and which might be pleasurable-the description of 
controlled erotic submission. For example, it may just be true-the 
Meese report suggests it is83-that pictures are more prone to cause 
violence than words, and that violent pictures are more prone to 
cause violence than non-violent pictures. It may also be true-sales of 
pornography to women suggest it is-that words are erotic in the way 
described above while pictures of dominance and submission are not. 
The Story of ~unquestionably violent-is, as Marcus suggests, a "lyri-
cal poem."84 Whatever else it is, it is words. 
It also, of course, may not be true. The Story of 0, no matter how 
erotic as text, might be proximately causing literally untold miseries-
83. To date, I am relying on media reports of the contents of the Meese Commis-
sion's report. 
84. M. Marcus, supra n.50, at 200. 
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silenced, actual, fearful, terrifYing enslavements-and no woman wants 
that. If it is, then we cannot have it both ways, and as Wendy Williams 
has said in a different context, where we can't have it both ways we 
have to think carefully about which way we want to have it.85 In my 
own mind, I have no doubt-if The Story of 0 is being re-enacted in 
real life on some farm somewhere in the hills of Kentucky right 
through to the bitter end, then we can all live without The Story of o. 
For me, this is not a close question, although I know it may be for 
others. But again-this poses a choice, and even if it is a hard choice, 
that is a far cry from a disabling contradiction. Erotic energy-no less 
than clean, cheap nuclear energy-comes with a price, and the price 
of both energies may be too high. 
Finally, we should draft an ordinance which properly targets the 
real injury without offending First Amendment principles; first be-
cause we will have to if we intend to actually use it, and second be-
cause those first amendment principles further more than they hinder 
feminist goals. We need at least some of this literature, and we need it 
for genuinely liberal as well as genuinely feminist reasons. First, we 
need to understand our ideals better than we presently do. The sex-
ual high many women reach from controlled objectification, domina-
tion and submission might stem from the pleasure of trust that can 
accompany inequality. Then again, it might not. But either way it 
would be nice to know. There may be contained in that pleasure the 
kernel of a critique of our dominant ideals of individual autonomy 
and equality. If we really believe that the personal is political, that 
should not sound ludicrous. It might, of course, be both 
nonludicrous and wrong: all that might be contained in our pleasure 
is a reflection of the extent of our debasement. But we won't know 
one way or the other unless we think about it, and we won't think 
about it so long as we regard the subject as taboo. One way to start 
thinking about it is to come to grips with the erotica-the textual rep-
resentation of controlled sexual domination and submission-that 
pleases us. 
There are other reasons, though, that women in particular need 
this literature. Some of us need it for sexual pleasure and release, 
which is not an insignificant need. All women, though, need the liter-
ature if we are ever to understand ourselves. We need, for example, 
The Story of o. If we are going to give it up because it causes injuries, 
then we should at least understand what we're giving up. Marcia Mar-
cus explains why: 
Germaine Greer was in Copenhagen in 1972 and a meeting was 
held at which she addressed and talked with Danish women. The 
atmosphere in the hall was high-spirited and optimistic, when sud-
denly a young woman cried out with desperation in her voice: "But 
85. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 
Women's Rts. L. Rep. 175, 195 (1982). 
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how can we start a women's movement when I bet three-quarters of 
us sitting in this room are masochists?"86 
Marcus concludes her discussion of The Story of 0 with this plea: 
I have kept back The Story of 0 for so long because I know no other 
book expressing so well all the contradictions involved in our image 
of womanhood. It features them so sharply and intensely that we 
cannot avoid feeling them in our bodies and deep down in our 
souls. What shall we do about those contradictions? 
o gives us a kind of answer, for she lives out what many of the rest 
of us have vague dreams about. Her story can teach us something 
about ourselves-what we must expect if we join in on male society's 
idea of what a woman is. It is a fable about women. But it will never 
come up with an unambiguous answer. It offers no solution, only a 
question mark. 
So we shall have to continue concerning ourselves with The Story of 
0, and I know no book that should be more central for the feminist 
movement to commit itself to, among other things, to be able to 
answer the young woman at the meeting with Germaine Greer.87 
III. CONCLUSION: WOMEN'S DIFFERENCE, AND AN ALTERNATIVE 
STANDARD FOR A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF LAw 
209 
Although liberal and radical legalism are typically contrasted, as I 
contrasted them in the bulk of this paper, I want briefly to suggest in 
this conclusion that it is by virtue of an assumption that liberalism and 
radicalism share that their respective chosen proxies for well-being-
choice and power-are so at odds with women's subjective, hedonic 
lives. Both liberal and radical legalism share a vision of the human 
being-and therefore of our subjective well-being-as "autonomous." 
The liberal insists that choice is necessary for the "true" exercise of 
that autonomy-and thus is an adequate proxy for subjective well-be-
ing-while the radical insists the same for power.88 But this strategic 
difference should not blind us to their commonality. Both the liberal 
and the radical legalist bave accepted the Kantian assumption that to 
be human is to be in some sense autonomous-meaning, minimally, to 
be differentiated, or individuated, from the rest of social life. 
Underlying and underscoring the poor fit between the proxies 
for subjective well-being endorsed by liberals and radicals-choice 
86. M. Marcus, supra n.50, dedication page. 
87. Id. at 208-09. 
88. Liberal feminism's embrace of "pro-choice" rhetoric as the language in 
which to couch their advocacy of reproductive freedom is the most obvious reflection 
of this commitment. The claim that "a woman has the right to control her own body" 
similarly reflects the liberal's belief that choice is central to our physical, as well as 
legal claim to autonomy. 
MacKinnon's belief that women's relationality reflects our victimization, not our 
essence, is vividly conveyed in her exchange with Gilligan in the Buffalo Symposium. 
See Buffalo Symposium, supra n.42, at 74-76. 
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and power-and women's subjective, hedonic lives is the simple fact 
that women's lives-because of our biological, reproductive role-are drasti-
cally at odds with this fundament?l vision of human life. Women's 
lives are not autonomous, they are profoundly relational. This is at 
least the biological reflection, if not the biological cause, of virtually 
all aspects, hedonic and otherwise, of our "difference." Women, and 
only women, and most women, transcend physically the differentiation 
or individuation of biological self from the rest of human life 
trumpeted as the norm by the entire Kantian tradition. When a wo-
man is pregnant her biological life embraces the embryonic life of 
another. When she later nurtures children, her needs will embrace 
their needs. The experience of being human, for women, differen-
tially from men, includes the counter-autonomous experience of a 
shared physical identity between woman and fetus, as well as the 
counter-autonomous experience of the emotional and psychological 
bond between mother and infant.89 
Our reproductive role renders us non-autonomous in a second, 
less obvious, but ultimately more far-reaching sense. Emotionally and 
morally women may benefit from the dependency of the fetus and the 
infant upon us. But materially we are more often burdened than en-
riched by that dependency. And because we are burdened, we differ-
entially depend more heavily upon others, both for our own survival, 
and for the survival of the children who are part of us. Women, more 
than men, depend upon relationships with others, because the weak-
est of human beings-infants-depend upon us. 
Thus, motherhood leaves us vulnerable: a woman giving birth is 
unable to defend herself against aggression; a woman nursing an in-
fant is physically exposed; a woman nurturing and feeding the young 
is less able to feed herself. Motherhood leaves us unequal: because of 
her distinctive nurturing role, a mother -is either stronger or weaker 
than those to whom she is closest. She is stronger than the infant, and 
because of her nurturing response to that fact she is weaker than her 
autonomous brother. Most assuredly, then, a mother is not autono-
mous; she is both depended upon and thereby dependent on others-
she depends upon others who are stronger than she, as others who 
are weaker depend upon her. To the considerable degree that our 
potentiality for motherhood defines ourselves, women's lives are rela-
tional, not autonomous. As mothers we nurture the weak and we de-
pend upon the strong. More than do men, we live in an 
interdependent and hierarchical natural web with others of varying 
degrees of strength. 
89. I am describing the way women's lives are, not the way they should be or have 
to be, and I therefore see no reason to distinguish biological from social causes of our 
counter-autonomous lives. If men became more nurturant of children, they too 
would become less "autonomous." My general point is that whatever subclass of adult 
human beings nurtures the young will be relatively less autonomous than the subclass 
that does not. 
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The goals the liberal and radical seek-increased freedom and 
increased equality, respectively-are surely intended to benefit the 
subjective well-being of human beings. That is, they are intended to 
benefit the well-being of autonomous creatures. These goals will sim-
ply not serve women, if women are not "autonomous." If women's 
"difference" lies in the fact that our lives are relational rather than 
autonomous, and if autonomy is a necessary attribute of a human be-
ing, then women's difference rather abruptly implies that women are 
not human beings. Politics that are designed to benefit human be-
ings-including liberal and radical legalism-:will leave women out in 
the cold. 
This is not a novel insight: that women are not human as human 
is now conceived has in a sense always been the dominant problem for 
feminism. But the two characteristic ways in which modem feminist 
legal theorists have responded to this dilemma are both, I think, 
flawed. The liberal feminist's solution is to deny it. The fact that wo-
men become pregnant, give birth, and nurse infants is a difference 
that does not count. It does not make us any less "autonomous" than 
men.90 For reasons which by now should be familiar, this response 
does not work: if the last century has taught us anything at all, it is that 
this liberal strategy of denial is a disservice.91 If we embrace a false 
conception of our nature we can be sure of only one thing, and that is 
that legal reform based on such a conception will only occasionally-
and then only incidentally-benefit real instead of hypothetical 
women. 
The radical feminist's proposal is that we seek to become autono-
mous creatures. We are indeed not "autonomous," but what that re-
flects is our lack of power-our social, political and legal 
victimization-not our essential nature. To the extent that we be-
come autonomous by gaining power, we will become the beneficiaries 
of the legal system designed to promote the well-being of just such 
people.92 This radical vision is at root deeply assimilationist-by gain-
ing power, we become equal, as we become equal we become less "re-
lational"-meaning less victimized-as we become less relational we 
become more autonomous, and as we become more autonomous we 
90. As Sylvia Law says, "An assimilationist vision that ignores differences between 
men and women does not help us to reconcile the ideal of equality with the reality of 
difference." Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 Penn. L. Rev. 955, 966 
(1984). Law's own position, though, that only biology differentiates women from 
men, has more in common with the assimilationist view she attacks than it does with 
radical feminism. See also Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 Ind. L. J. 375 
(1981). 
91. See Law, [d. 
92. Compare MacKinnon, who wants to "get the boot off of women's necks," with 
Dinnerstein, who wants to share the burden of child-rearing. Both view women's lack 
of autonomy as the obstacle to full participation in society, and accordingly as the 
cause of women's misery. Compare MacKinnon, Buffaw Symposium, supra note 42, with 
D. Dinnerstein, The Mermaid And The Minotaur (1976). 
HeinOnline -- 15 Wis. Women’s L.J. 212 2000
212 WISCONSIN WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:149 
become more like "human beings"-more like men. Radical assimila-
tion, though, has costs no less weighty (and no less familiar) than lib-
eral denial. There is no guarantee that women can become 
autonomous "human beings," no guarantee that women want to, and 
at heart, no persuasive argument that women should. 
A very new and third response, which does not fit easily (or at all) 
within the liberal and radical models described above, and which I 
think has great promise, is that feminists should insist on women's 
humanity-and thus on our entidements-and on the wrongness of 
the dominant conception of what it means to be a "human being." 
We should insist, as Christine Litdeton has argued, for an equal "ac-
ceptance of our difference."93 This third course is surely more prom-
ising-it has truth and candor on its side-but without hedonistic 
criticism it is insufficient: which differences are to be accepted? The 
root of our difference may be that our lives are relational rather than 
autonomous, which is reflected in our needs and has its roots in our 
reproductive role. But even thus defined, our "difference" has many 
dimensions. If "difference" includes our differential suffering, or our 
differential vulnerability to sexual assault, or our differential endur-
ance of pain, or our differentially negative self-esteem, then "accept-
ance" of those differences will backfire. We need more than just 
acceptance of our differences; we need a vocabulary in which to artic-
ulate and then evaluate them, as well as the power to reject or affirm 
them. 
My proposal is that we address the multiple problems posed by 
our differences from men by adopting a critical legal method which 
aims direcdy for women's subjective well-being, rather than indirecdy 
through a gauze of definitional presuppositions about the nature of 
human life which almost invariably exclude women's lives. We should 
aim, simply, to increase women's happiness, joy and pleasure, and to 
lessen women's suffering, misery and pain. As feminist legal critics we 
could employ this standard: a law is a good law if it makes our lives 
happier and less painful and a bad law if it makes us miserable, or 
stabilizes the conditions that cause our suffering. A shift toward this 
direct hedonism, I believe, would do four things for our developing 
feminist legal theory. 
First, a move toward hedonistic criticism would free us from false 
conceptions of our nature. Our present "equality" discourse (whether 
cast in terms of equal freedom or equal power) has forced us to ac-
cept dominant visions of the "human being" whose equality we seek. 
By foregoing proxies for subjective well-being which are in tum de-
rived from those visions, and insisting instead on pleasure and pain, 
happiness and misery, joy and sorrow, as our central normative cate-
93. See in addition to Littleton's contribution to this volume, Note, Toward a Re-
definition of Sexual Equality, 95 HaIV. L. Rev. 487 (1981). 
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gories, we can remain agnostic toward varying definitional concep-
tions of who we are. 
Second, a move toward hedonistic criticism would facilitate an 
unclouded articulation of the equality of women's hedonic lives. 
When we try to squeeze descriptions of our lives into the parameters 
laid out for us, the results are often not just distorted, but profoundly 
anomalous. We are trying too hard to assimilate, in our theory as well 
as in our professional and personal lives. 
Third, I believe, a shift toward a discourse that would focus atten-
tion on the pain in women's lives, and away from the oppression and 
subordination we suffer, would make us more effective. Ifwe are ever 
going to make progress in alleviating women's misery-surely an im-
portant goal for feminist legalists-we must insist loudly upon the nor-
mative significance of our hedonic lives. To draw an analogy, Martin 
Luther King argued again and again94 that the essence-the domi-
nant fact-of the Negro's life is pain, that that fact would not change 
until the white liberal would come to share it, that he would not share 
it until he felt it, that he would not be able to feel it until he under-
stood it, and that he would not understand it until the Negro suc-
ceeded in bringing the pain to the surface-until he could make its 
content palpable. Only then would the pain be mitigated. I believe 
that the same is true of women: the fundamental fact of women's lives 
is pain, that fact will not change until men share it, which will not in 
turn occur until its meaning and content is communicated. If we are 
ever to do anything about the pain which is women's lives-the vio-
lence, the danger, the boredom, the ennui, the non-productivity, the 
poverty, the fear, the numbness, the frigidity, the isolation, the low 
self-esteem, and the pathetic attempts to assimilate-we must first 
make the feel of that pain palpable, and hence shared. But we will 
not even attempt to do so as long as we embrace models of legal criti-
cism that deny the relevance of subjective pain and pleasure, happi-
ness and suffering, joy and sorrow, to the critical evaluation of law. 
The liberal and radical legalism to which feminist legal theory is now 
wed do precisely that. They both assume the sufficiency of an objec-
tive proxy-either choice or equality-for subjective well-being. By 
doing so, they virtually insure the irrelevance of rich descriptions of 
felt pain and pleasure to a feminist criticism of law. 
Lastly, by forcing into the public discourse descriptions of wo-
men's subjective, hedonic lives, the conception of the "human being" 
assumed by that discourse-the 'substantive description of exper-
ienced human life which the phrase "human being" denotes-might 
change so as to actually include women. For this reason alone, wo-
men need to develop descriptions of the quality of our hedonic lives. 
94. See e.g., M. L. King, The Words Of Martin Luther King (ed., Coretta Scott 
King) 22 (1983). 
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There are two problems. Women's subjective, internal pain, be-
cause it is so silent and invisible-and because it is so different-is 
quite literally incomprehensible. To state the obvious-men do not 
understand, have not shared, have not heard, and have not felt, the 
pain-the numbing terror-of an unwanted pregnancy. They have 
not heard, shared or felt the tortuous violence of a stranger rape or 
the debilitating, disintegrating and destructive self-alienation of nonvi-
olent marital rape. Men do not know that women's "frigidity"-our 
endurance of unpleasant, unwanted, nonmutual, and nonetheless 
fully "consensual" sex-is not only neither funny nor a "sexual disor-
der," but is painful, and thus injurious. Relatedly, men have no con-
ception of what "non-violent" forms of rape are even about, for the 
simple reason that they have no sense of what could possibly be pain-
ful about sex, when it is not accompanied by a threat of violence. This 
communication breakdown is not slight or incidental, it is total. 
Men's conception of pain-of what it is-is derived from a set of expe-
rience which excludes women's experience. When women and men 
talk about pain (and to a lesser extent, about pleasure) we are employ-
ing vastly different experiential referents. 
The second problem is this: women have a seemingly endless ca-
pacity to lie, both to ourselves and others, about what gives us pain 
and what gives us pleasure. This is not all that surprising. If what we 
need to do to survive, materially and psychically, is have heterosexual 
penetration three to five times a week, then we'll do it, and if the 
current ethic is that we must not only do it, but enjoy it, well then, 
we'll enjoy it. We'll report as pleasure what we feel as pain. It is terri-
bly difficult to get to the bottom of these lies, partly because we convey 
them not just with our words, but with our bodies. Whatever else wo-
men have learned to do, women have learned to not speak the truth. 
It is now a commonplace that women don't "feel at home" with male 
language-but this is no wonder, when what we've mainly learned to 
do with it is lie. 
Both problems strike me as surmountable. Women must start 
speaking the truth about the quality of our internal lives. The pain 
women feel may be unique, but women and men (I believe) are alike 
in this way: both women and men resist pain when it is our own, and 
(most) women and (most) men will sympathetically resist pain suf-
fered by others, when that pain is meaningfully communicated. And 
even if that is unduly optimistic, it is at least clear that without a clear 
articulation of the content and meaning of our pain, it will not be 
sympathetically resisted by men who do not share it. But more funda-
mentally, women will come to recognize the truth about our inner 
lives only when we start to speak it. Women's inner reality simply does 
not fit the Kantian conception of human nature that underlies so 
much of our liberal and radical legalist commitments. It is only by 
starting with our own experiences that we will be able to develop a 
description of human nature which is faithful to our lived reality, 
HeinOnline -- 15 Wis. Women’s L.J. 215 2000
2000] DIFFERENCE IN WOMEN'S HEDONIC llVES 215 
rather than one which ignores it. From that set of descriptions, and 
only from that set of descriptions, can we construct, or reconstruct, 
our own political ideals, whether they be autonomy, equality, free-
dom, fraternity, sisterhood, or something completely other, and as yet 
unnamed. 
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